

Government of Tanzania  
United Nations Development Programme  
National Income Generation Program  
Ford Foundation  
International Labour Organisation

## EVALUATION OF HANNA NASSIF COMMUNITY BASED URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT PHASE I.

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Dar es Salaam  
January 1997

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### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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The report is based on the findings of an evaluation mission which visited Tanzania from the 6th to 19th January 1997. The views expressed in this report reflect explicitly the opinions of the Mission Team and are not necessarily those of the National Authorities or International Agencies.

5th May 1997, Dar es Salaam

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|    |       |   |
|----|-------|---|
| 1  | ARI   | Ardhi Institute   |
| 2  | CBOs  | Community Based Organisation                              |
| 3  | CCC   | Community Construction Contract                           |
| 4  | CCM   | Chama Cha Mapinduzi (The Ruling Party)                    |
| 5  | CDC   | Community Development Committee                           |
| 6  | CIP   | Community Infrastructure Programme (World Bank supported) |
| 7  | DCC   | Dar Es Salaam City Council/Dar Es Salaam City Commission  |
| 8  | EDF   | European Development Fund                                 |
| 9  | HBEs  | Home Based Enterprises                                    |
| 10 | IDA   | International Development Agency                          |
| 11 | ILO   | International Labour Organisation                         |
| 12 | LIFE  | Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment           |
| 13 | MHC   | Mwito Housing Cooperative                                 |
| 14 | MLHUD | Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development          |
| 15 | NGOs  | Non Governmental Organizations                            |
| 16 | NIGP  | National Income Generation Programme                      |
| 17 | SDP   | Sustainable Dar Es Salaam Project                         |
| 18 | Tshs  | Tanzanian Shilling  |
| 19 | TST   | Technical Support Team                                    |
| 20 | UCLAS | University College of Lands and Architectural Studies     |
| 21 | UNCHS | United Nations Center for Human Settlements (HABITAT)     |
| 22 | UNDP  | United Nations Development Programme                      |
| 23 | UNV   | United Nations Volunteers                                 |

**Rate of exchange:**  
(at the time of the mission)

1 US\$ = 600 Tanzanian Shillings

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### General Background

Hanna Nassif settlement is located in Kinondoni District. It is approximately 4 km from the city centre. By 1994 the settlement had a population of approximately 19,000 people. Prior to execution of the project the area experienced flooding due to absence of drainage facilities. Being one among the 44 unplanned settlements in Dar es Salaam city, Hanna Nassif was also deficient of other basic infrastructure services such as solid waste collection facilities, paved roads, water supply and human wastes disposal facilities.

The Government efforts through the World Bank supported Programme of Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading could not reach Hanna Nassif because of lack of funds. Possibilities of upgrading Hanna Nassif faded away when the World Bank pulled out of the Programme in the Second Phase (i.e. in early 1980s). Similarly the 1989 upgrading proposal by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development was not implemented because of lack of funds. These disappointing events of not upgrading the settlement, provoked a sense of appeal, inquiry and self-help from the community. With assistance from Community Leaders and the Zonal Director of Kinondoni, residents decided to look for solutions by themselves. This determination drew the attention of the ILO, under the programme 'Employment Generation Through the Efficient Use of Local Resources'. This led to the formulation of Hanna Nassif Community Based Upgrading Project in 1992. Implementation took off in March 1994.

The basic new concept of the project was to empower the community to create and develop its own infrastructure with the assistance from Donor Agencies. The idea was to launch a pilot project and use the experience in other similar Programmes. Initially, the project was planned to be executed in 18 months starting from March 1994 and ending in August 1995. However, the project period was extended to March 1996 due to delays in the preparatory work and further extended to August 1996 so as to complete the main drainage channels.

### Project Objectives

The three immediate objectives as provided in the project document were;

- A pilot project on community-based employment-intensive storm water drainage infrastructure upgrading of Hanna Nassif will be successfully completed; introducing in turn some capacity within the Dar es salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives.
- The capacity for the Dar-es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner with community-based urban upgrading proposals will be created and expanded.
- A support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni unplanned settlements, involving a network of community volunteers, will be established.

The project which was financed by the UNDP, The European Development Fund (EDF), Ford Foundation and The Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment (LIFE), was executed by the ILO. The UNCHS (Habitat) and UNV were associated Agencies. The immediate beneficiaries were residents of Hanna Nassif and the Dar es salaam City Council, now the Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC).

### Achievement of Objectives

The achievements of these objectives were very positive and the Evaluation Mission observed the following,

- A functioning and maintainable storm water and other basic infrastructure service were constructed to a satisfactory level.
- Employment creation of 24,430 work-days being 4,430 above target of 20,000. Of the total work days created , 65% constituted of man-days and 35% women-days.
- Maintenance of drains, training material and training of selected people was successfully carried out. A women group which was established during the project period (but not part of the project) has been cleaning the drains for sometime.
- A series of seminars and workshops were held on Hanna Nassif thereby providing training to technical working groups, the CDC and the seconded staff from the DCC.

However, it was noted that the project was less successful in the overall aspects of community mobilization and participation. Despite the fact that a committed CDC was formed and participated fully in the implementation process, the participation of the wider community was not to the expected level. The reason behind this failure emanated from inadequate mobilization efforts from the part of the Agencies which were responsible for this task. Similarly the nature of the concept of Community Participation, which is rather new in the urban setting of Tanzania hindered effective implementation of the project.

Despite the positive achievements in the physical progress of developing phase I of this project, there were a number of problems encountered during the implementation process and where necessary corrections made. These included the following:

- The project underestimated the need for comprehensive designs of both road and drainage channels. It seems the engineering design were made piece by piece concurrent with the construction stage.
- Some engineering components were also not or partially considered despite their significance in infrastructure works. For example laboratory soil tests, thickness and capacity of the road base and road design were given partial significance in such a construction work. Although the final quality is acceptable and the infrastructure is durable and maintainable, some of the work items, should have been done better if constant engineering input and experience in community managed projects had been available.
- Seemingly, the CDC and the TST who were deciding which type of work should be carried out and by whom, underestimated some of these inputs mainly in belief that they can be done without hiring a consultant or contractor. This brought some implementation problems which were in a later stage corrected by engaging COWI- Consult to supervise the work during the absence of a TST engineer.

There are a few work items which still have to be completed. For example, hundreds of steel bars (10-40 cm long) are left standing out from the drain walls; the walls of the open drain (some sections are 1.5 meter deep) do not have any uniform edges which would not only give a better engineering appearance to the drains, but protect people from slipping into the drain; and the quality of the murrum road is also to be improved. Although maintenance works have taken place, this has not yet happened on a regular organized way. The launching of a viable maintenance system remains therefore the priority task of the second phase.

## Physical Outputs

Until the end of the first phase, in August 1996, 1.0 Kilometre of murrum road with side drains was constructed out of a target of 2.5 Kilometres. About 1.5 Kilometres of side drains and 600 metres of main drain were constructed. A total length of 700 metres of footpath along the main drain and at the end of Road No 1 has been improved. Other completed construction works include 10 vehicular culverts crossing main drain and road No 1, gabions to protect existing gullies in the settlement and more than 10 road drifts to direct storm water into the constructed drains.

It is evident that the implementation of Hanna Nassif community based upgrading project is in many aspects innovative and unique. It is the first urban project in Tanzania where the Community Based Organization, the CDC took charge in partnership with the City Commission and International Agencies to solve problems in their areas.

### **The Need for Evaluation**

The need for the evaluation of Phase I of the project has been stated in the Terms of Reference as;

- To establish the relevance of the project objectives for urban upgrading in unplanned settlements.
- The need to establish the extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and,
- To recommend the future orientation of the project.

### **Lessons Learnt**

The Hanna Nassif urban upgrading project is a brave new initiative from the part of the city administration, Donors and the Community. It is a pilot operation, the experience of which is to be used for expanding the programme to other unplanned settlements in the city. The concept empowers communities to create their own infrastructure services. In Hanna Nassif the decisive factor was how well the project was able to mobilize members of a new community for the creation of community assets. One of the most important lessons learnt was that the development of sense of community ownership in a new urban ad-hoc settlement is a complex social and economic problem which requires special skill and adequate time to deal with. The project succeeded well to establish a functioning Community Development Committee (CDC) for identifying and constructing their own priority infrastructure services. But due to time constraint, there was a slow progress in motivating community members to undertake the ownership of the created assets. The overall result of this project however, is still very positive, the experiences and lessons learnt will provide a model and guidance for the Phase II of Hanna Nassif and other community managed urban upgrading programs.

### **Structure of the Report**

This report has been structured into five main parts. Part one elaborate the concept and design of the project. Part two elucidates the organizational and implementation arrangement of the project. Part three provide an analytical framework on community mobilization and participation and the fourth part provide an evaluation of project implementation. The last section i.e. part five elucidates the summary of lessons learnt and recommendations.

The Mission Team is convinced that the valuable experience gained and lessons learnt by the implementation of the Hanna Nassif Community Based Urban Upgrading Project could be favorably used to improve the program of the Phase II, and provide a basic model for the upgrading of un-planned settlements of Dar es Salaam and other cities of Tanzania.

Updated by BC. Approved by SR. Last update: 31 March, 1998.



## *Evaluation of Hanna Nassif community based urban upgrading project phase I, cont.*

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### **1.0 PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN**

#### **1.1 Socio-Economic Context**

##### *1.1.1 Squatter Settlements and Upgrading Programmes in Tanzania*

Informal housing settlements provide shelter to the majority of the urban poor in Tanzania. In Dar es Salaam City for example, about 70% of the total population live in these areas. For the case of other towns, about 60% of the people have their accommodation located in these settlements. Before independence, the colonial restrictions on native migration from rural to urban areas confined 'squatters' to few isolated peri-urban settlements characterized by scattered homesteads. However, the post-independence urbanization rates of about 9.5% (1967-1978) and 7.7% (1978-1988) have been cited in several studies as the major contributory factor for the consolidation and emergence of new unplanned settlements in urban Tanzania.

In the 1960s, the government policy towards unplanned settlements was that of clearing all squatter housing and shanty towns and replacing them with conventional (standard) housing. This optimistic approach of solving the housing problem by the Government (direct provision of houses) was not successful because of two reasons. First the projects were becoming very expensive and the number of new units were falling short in absolute terms when compared to the cleared housing stock. Secondly the project caused disruption of the socio-economic set-up e.g. reduction of local employment and Home Based Enterprises (HBEs). The Slum Clearance Programme became un-affordable and was terminated in 1969.

In 1972, the Government adopted a more humane and softer approach to 'squatters' and developed the Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Programme. Like in many other developing countries, the programme aimed at enabling beneficiaries to undertake construction of houses by themselves. The Government was responsible for provision of serviced sites and housing loans. Also unplanned settlements were upgraded by providing them with basic infrastructure services and community facilities. With financial assistance from the World Bank-International Development Agency (IDA), substantial physical improvements in unplanned settlements took place. Similarly substantial amount of serviced sites were made available. The programme was implemented in the city of Dar es Salaam and the Municipalities of Mwanza, Mbeya, Iringa, Tanga, Tabora and Morogoro. The World Bank pulled out of the project at the end of the second phase (i.e. in early 1980s) because of poor project performance. It was also during this period that the country was experiencing an unprecedented economic recession as the aftermath of the country's war with Uganda, the disintegration of the East African Community, increase in oil prices and drastic drop in crop commodity prices.

After the withdrawal of the World Bank support, the Government alone could not finance additional projects. Desperate efforts under the Third Phase saw isolated projects in Dar es Salaam city with negligible physical improvements in unplanned settlements. Thus the decade of 1980-1990 was characterized by the expansion, consolidation and emergence of new unplanned settlements. It was also during this period that the upgraded areas experienced rapid deterioration of the services which were provided under the First and Second Phases of the Programme due to lack of maintenance.

##### *1.1.2 National Policy Towards Unplanned Settlements*

Observing these disappointing trends in 'Squatter' development, the Government formulated the Urban Development Policy in 1995 to address these problems. The Policy states clearly that the Government efforts will, from now onwards be directed to stop the growth of unplanned settlements by;

- Timely planning of all potential areas for urban development in the periphery of towns so as to pre-empt haphazard development.
- Designating special areas for low income housing with simplified building regulations. These areas will be provided with minimum level of services which the residents can afford.

The Policy acknowledges the considerable stock of houses in unplanned settlements which must be preserved. It recommends that existing areas will therefore not be cleared but upgraded. In upgrading, the unplanned settlements will be provided with minimum level of facilities for adequate sanitation and other basic services. Except for unplanned housing in hazardous areas, the land rights of residents of unplanned settlements will be protected. Upgrading plans will be prepared and implemented by Local Authorities with the participation of residents and their local community organizations. Local resources will be mobilized to finance the plans through appropriate cost recovery systems.

In implementing the National Urban Development Policy, The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD) is handing over the Sites and Services Programme to Urban Local Authorities. Also the same Ministry is being restructured with the understanding that its future involvement in these Programmes will only be at policy level. The execution will be vested upon the Urban Local Authorities.

As far as Hanna Nassif Project is concerned, the MLHUD was not directly involved in the implementation process. However, in order to gain experience from this pilot project and replicate the experience to other unplanned settlements and towns, the Ministry provided its staff to the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP), which has been working out sustainable strategies towards upgrading unplanned settlements.

### *1.1.3 Needs of Unplanned Settlements and their Communities*

The needs of many unplanned settlements and their communities in Dar es Salaam city today can be cited as;

- Provision of basic infrastructure services to about 44 unplanned settlements which are severely deficient in water supply, drainage systems, sanitary and human waste disposal facilities, access and footpaths, paved secondary and tertiary roads and solid waste collection facilities.
- Establishing efficient machinery for Maintenance Programmes and cost recovery to the areas which were upgraded in the 1970's and early 1980's. Some of the infrastructure services which were provided during this period have deteriorated to a state of disrepair due to lack of effective machinery for Maintenance Programmes.
- Capacity building of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to undertake upgrading activities in their localities. Given the diminishing trend of Government involvement in these activities and the emerging communities' initiatives and willingness to upgrade their areas, it is apparent that the empowerment of CBO's and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will facilitate bottom-up participatory upgrading of several unplanned settlements in the city. It should also be emphasized here that most of the CBOs have emerged recently to respond to problems in their localities. So they are both technically and financially immature to undertake substantial improvements in their areas.
- Capacity building and awareness creation of Urban Local Authorities to work, and share power with the Local Communities is at this moment essential.
- Government's technical and financial support still remains a key input in building grassroots

community participation. Services that can be provided at city level e.g. solid waste collection, trunk and secondary roads and water mains still remains to be the government's responsibility.

#### *1.1.4 The Case of Hanna Nassif*

Hanna Nassif settlement is located in Kinondoni District. It is approximately 4 kilometers from the city centre. The settlement used to be a coconut plantation before the abolition of free hold titles in 1963. The higher urbanization trends of the 1960's led to rapid development of informal housing in this area. By 1975 there were already 955 houses and this figure had risen to 2,136 houses in October 1994. A research done by Ardhi Institute in 1994 revealed that the settlement provides accommodation to about 19,000 people in 4,277 households.

A study commissioned by the ILO to Ardhi Institute in 1991 revealed that the lack of storm water drainage was a crucial problem in the area. During the rain season many houses were flooded. The flooding caused frequent filling up of pit latrines in the settlement. The overflowing waste water from the pit latrines caused health risks to the residents.

In 1976, Hanna Nassif settlement was earmarked for upgrading under the Second Phase of the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading Programme. The upgrading could not be implemented because of lack of funds. Again under the Third Phase of the same Programme (1981-1986) Hanna Nassif was selected for project execution but the withdrawal of the World Bank from the Programme led to the cancellation of the proposal.

Notwithstanding these attempts, in 1989, the MLHUD prepared an upgrading plan for the area. Again this plan was not implemented because of lack of funds. However, the Ministry has been using the plan as a basis for issuance of survey instructions to house owners applying for plot demarcation and cadastral surveys.

The disappointing events of not upgrading the settlement provoked a sense of appeal, inquiry and self help from the community. With the inspiration of Community leaders (the Ward Executive Officer and the Councilor for Hanna Nassif), the community approached the Zonal Director of Kinondoni District in 1991 to look for alternative approaches of upgrading their area. This marked the beginning of Community Based Upgrading initiative in Hanna Nassif.

## **1.2 Setting of Project**

### *1.2.1 Initiation of the Project*

The Hanna Nassif Community Based Upgrading Project was initiated in 1992 following an International Labour Organisation (ILO) mission to Tanzania and other African countries which aimed at promoting employment generation through labour based urban upgrading projects. In the same year i.e. 1992, the Zonal Director of Kinondoni approached the (ILO) which, as already mentioned had a plan of applying their long term experience of rural projects in the urban context. The main focus of the project was centered on employment generation in urban infrastructure using locally available resources. A Community Development Committee (CDC) was formed in 1993 and actual project execution started in March 1994. The project was funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ford Foundation and the European Development Fund (EDF). It was executed by the ILO. The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS-Habitat) and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) were Associated Agencies.

The new concept of the project was to empower the community to create and develop its own

infrastructure through the assistance of the International Agencies and the Dar es Salaam City Council, now the Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC). The idea was to launch the project as a pilot operation and use the experience in other similar programs. Initially, the project was planned to be executed in 18 months (starting from March 1994 and ending in August 1995). However, due to delays in the preparatory work the project period was extended to March 1996. The project period was further extended to August 1996 to complete the main drainage channels.

### *1.2.2 The Project Document*

The project document was prepared in UNDP format. It was the result of several Ardhi Institute, ILO and UNCHS studies and reports on Hanna Nassif. It reflected well the related policies of the Government and that of the UN agencies. It addressed also clearly the problems of the Community and set realistic objectives and targets.

The project document was elaborate on the basis of substantial research and analytical works on Hanna Nassif. The analyses and approach elaborated in the project document have since been used in other similar projects. With regard to community participation, however, all the difficulties were not foreseen. There was little experience on the character and behavior of new urban communities.

The Project Document has, however, proved to be over optimistic with regard to time and input required for developing community ownership spirit. Despite being elaborate on the need and provisions for engineering inputs and personnel (provision for an UNV engineer, a national engineer and a technician but little provision for international engineering backstopping) the actual implementation on this part faced some problems as shall be explained later.

### *1.2.3 Project Objectives*

The three immediate objectives which reflected the comparative advantages of the executing and associated agencies were well set to promote the achievement of the development objective which was targeting at improved and expanded living conditions in urban informal settlements in Dar es Salaam. The three immediate objectives of the project were:

**Immediate objective 1** which targeted at a pilot project on community based, employment-intensive infrastructure up-grading in Hanna Nassif be successfully completed, introducing in turn, capacity within the City Council to respond to such community based initiatives,

**Immediate objective 2** which aimed at building-up and expanding the capacity for the Dar-es-Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner to community-based up-grading proposals,

**Immediate objective 3** which was concerned with the establishment of a functional support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni settlements, through the development of a network of community volunteers.

Besides the above mentioned objectives, one of the main objectives of the Hanna Nassif Community-Based Upgrading Project was to involve the community in the whole upgrading process through mobilization and participation. This was an innovative and welcome departure from previous upgrading efforts which hardly involved Communities. The approach was especially appropriate since it coincided with the time when the community leaders were looking for solutions to their infrastructure problems and especially problems related to flooding. Since efforts to get support from the Government during previous upgrading projects were futile, by this time the community had realized that the need to look for solutions by themselves was an inevitable process.

The principle of, as strong as possible, community participation required the adaptation of methods and modalities to community implementation. For this reason, it was appropriate to select the type of infrastructure, labour-based methods and community contracts which suited well the inexperienced CDC and community members. CDC also decided at the beginning to carry out the construction without demolishing houses and buildings. This principle was well received from the part of community members who strongly cooperated therefore in the construction. The CDC further decided to follow the ILO recommendation to use labour-based methods in order to create immediate employment within the community. This decision was also welcomed and supported. The Evaluation Mission noted however, that the decision of the CDC to keep all contracts for community execution was a commanding act, but it overestimated the technical capabilities of community which resulted in problems in the construction works.

### 1.3 The Budget

Financial support was provided by the UNDP, Ford Foundation, the European Development Fund and the Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment (LIFE). The Community was supposed to contribute about 5% of the total project grant i.e. Tshs 8.0 million and the City Council Tshs 16.0 million (in kind). The budget for Hanna Nassif Pilot project was as shown in table 1.1 below:

**TABLE 1.1 FINANCIAL INPUTS**

| NO       | AGENCY                 | BUDGET           | SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE (INTENDED).  | REMARKS  |
|----------|------------------------|------------------|---|--|
| 1        | Government (DCC) Input | Tshs. 16,000,000 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tshs. 14.5 personnel (consultative group &amp; Technical Team)</li> <li>• Tshs. 1.5 for Zonal office accommodation and sundry expenses.</li> </ul>   | In Kind  |
| 2        | Hanna Nassif Community | Tshs. 8,000,000  | For operation and maintenance and community expenditure   | Partly in kind   |
| 3        | Ford Foundation,       | US\$ 200,000     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US \$ 175,000 Investment fund</li> <li>• US\$ 10,000 Maintenance of infrastructure</li> <li>• US\$ 10,000 For Training</li> <li>• US\$ 5,000 Office supplies and equipment</li> </ul>  |  |
| 4        | EDF                    | US\$ 40,000      | • Purchase of materials and equipment   | Funds were disbursed in Tshs and due to exchange rate reduction, this amount was reduced to equivalence of US\$ 28,740 |
| 5<br>5.1 | UNDP<br>ILO            | US\$ 203,000     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$ 39,000 National Staff</li> <li>• US\$ 54,000 International Consultants</li> <li>• US\$ 32,500 for Labour and Materials</li> <li>• US\$ 35,000 for Training</li> <li>• US\$ 27,000 for Others e.g. Vehicles, sundries, Duty Travel, Premises &amp; Reporting.</li> </ul> |  |
| 5.2      | UNCHS                  | US\$ 91,000      | UNCHS Support to DCC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$ 10,000 National staff (Engineer)</li> <li>• US\$ 8,000 International Consultants (Community Contract Consultant)</li> <li>• US\$ 10,000 for monitoring (Ardhi)</li> </ul>  | The original budget from the UNDP stood at US\$ 550,000. But this amount was later on reduced to US\$ 350,000.         |

|              |      |   |   |  |
|--------------|------|---|---|--|
|              |      |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· US\$ 20,000 settlements survey (42 informal settlements - Ardhi)</li> <li>· US\$ 17,500 for non-expendable Equipment e.g. surveying equipment &amp; motorcycle.</li> <li>· US\$ 25,000 for Training e.g. workshops for TST &amp; Community Action Planning; Training Manual Video Documentation of Pilot project.</li> </ul> |  |
| 5.3          | UNV  | US\$ 56,000                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· US\$ 2500 National personnel</li> <li>· US\$ 41,000 Internationals</li> <li>· US\$ 7,500 Non-Expendable (3 Motorcycles)</li> <li>· US\$ 5,000 Training-Seminars Subcontracted to NGO's</li> </ul>  |  |
| 6            | LIFE | US\$ 18,000                                   | US\$ 6,000 for purchase of construction materials and the remaining was used to finish construction works under phase I.  |  |
| <b>TOTAL</b> |      | <b>US\$ 578,740</b><br><b>Tshs 24,000,000</b> |   |  |

*Source: Project Document URT / 94/009-Improving Living Conditions and Expanding Employment Opportunities in Urban Low Communities, March 1994.*

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## 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS



Construction of the main storm water drain



Excavation of the main drain through garbage depot

## 2.1 Institutional Arrangements

The general institutional arrangement focused on the CDC as the central body for day to day operation of community activities. Other actors included the Government Ministries, the DCC, International Agencies and Consultants and the Community. Initially the Zonal Director for Kinondoni was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the project implementation. But this responsibility was later on shifted to the City Director. The Agencies and their roles in the project were outlined as follows:

**ILO:** Promotion of employment intensive and participatory strategies, particularly in relation to infrastructure works, skills training, appropriate building materials and small scale enterprise development.

**UNCHS (Habitat):** Support to Local Government in the implementation of enabling, affordable and sustainable human settlements policies with particular attention being paid to planning, designing and coordinating affordable settlement upgrading projects that maximize opportunities for employment and income generation.

**UNV:** Support the communities to mobilize, identify needs, establish a sense of ownership and thus increase their bargaining power with public authorities and promote local initiative through community voluntarism and networking.

**The CDC:** To represent the overall Hanna Nassif Community and act as a bridge between the Community (residents of Hanna Nassif) and the DCC and the Donor Agencies. Besides bridging, the CDC has the responsibility of mobilizing people for project financing particularly on collecting their contribution, their involvement in infrastructure construction and the future monitoring, operation and maintenance of infrastructure to be provided by the project.

**The DCC :** To support the project by creating conducive environment for smooth implementation of project. The DCC also provided technical personnel to build capacity and subsequently adapt the experience from this project to other unplanned settlements.

**The Steering Committee:** The Steering Committee drew members from the CDC, the City Council, the Technical Support Team, Donors and Executing Agencies. Under the chairmanship of the City Commission, the Steering Committee played a key role of coordinating all parties involved in the project and resolving problems whenever they arose. The meetings which were scheduled quarterly, could also take place whenever there was a need to do so.


The UN Agencies provided technical assistance to the CDC in the form of project personnel, (National and International) subcontracts, training / study tours, tools / equipment and logistics.

An International Consultant Engineer assisted the Technical Team and the CDC, in the design and construction process. The Consultant Engineer also made back-stopping missions. COWI-Consult was at one time called to give technical supervision in laying storm water drainage channels. The company was later contracted to consolidate and compile the designs of the main drain from the various designs and studies which were already done by the ILO Consulting Engineer.

## 2.2 Overall Organisation and Technical Supervision

The overall organisation of the project centered on the CDC which is the central body representing the community. It was supposed to lead all day to day operations of community activities in the area, (refer to figure 1). The CDC was supported by a Technical Support Team (TST). The implementation progress was to be coordinated through Inter-Agency and Steering Committee Meetings.

**Figure 1. Organizational Set-Up of the Project**



*Source: SDP (1994), Community Infrastructure Programme For Dar es Salaam.*

The Programme Officer at the ILO area office gave daily back-stopping to the National Professionals. The Technical Support Team (TST) was composed of:

- |   |                                |         |
|---|--------------------------------|---------|
| 1 | National Programme Coordinator | (ILO)   |
| 1 | National Project Engineer      | (UNCHS) |
| 1 | National Project Surveyor      | (UNCHS) |
| 1 | Senior Project Technician      | (ILO)   |
| 1 | Senior Community Animator      | (ILO)   |

- 1 UNV Specialist Coordinator<sup>1</sup> (UNV)
- 1 DDS Field Worker<sup>2</sup> (UNV)

In August 1996, another Community Animator was employed by ILO to deal with local fund raising.

The technical supervision was impeded by the limited engineering input in the first year. This was a result of abscondment of the engineering personnel first attached to the project. The engineering input which was provided by the ILO Engineering Consultant was however not full time and especially in the start up of the project more regular technical backstopping would have been appropriate. Besides, the absence of comprehensive engineering designs, technical inputs (such as laboratory soil tests and comprehensive surveys) and the erratic participation of the seconded Town Planning Personnel were the limiting factors for smooth implementation of the project<sup>3</sup>.

### 2.3 Project Management Structure, Monitoring and Reporting

Regular Steering Committee meetings to be chaired by the project director (City Director) were envisaged. It was also envisaged that during the span of the project there will be a Tripartite Review (a joint review by representatives of the Government, the UNDP, the ILO and Associated Agencies, the UNCHS and UNV) within the first twelve months of the project. It was further anticipated that after the twelve months of the start of full implementation, the project shall be subject to evaluation. The Programme Coordinator was supposed to make sure that the flow of information to all agencies involved in the project was maintained.

### 2.4 Work Plans

Work plans were prepared for each agency which participated in the project covering the project period of March 1994 to September 1995. Each agency prepared its plan in relation to its respective tasks. However, many of the work plans put insufficient emphasis on community mobilization, ensitization and technical engineering advice, issues which adversely affected the implementation of phase I of the project. In fact, community mobilization was supposed to have had been a continuous process throughout the project period. Elaboration on the shortfalls of this aspect has been provided under section 3.0. Chapter 4 will discuss the shortfalls regarding the engineering input.

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## 3.0 COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION

### 3.1 Community Mobilization and Participation

One of the main objectives of the Hanna Nassif community-based upgrading project was to involve the community in the whole upgrading process through mobilization and participation. This was an innovative and welcome departure from previous upgrading efforts which hardly involved communities. The approach was especially appropriate since it coincided with the time when the community leaders were looking for solution to their infrastructure problems and especially problems related to flooding. Efforts to get support from the government during previous upgrading projects were futile and by this time the community had realized the need to look for a solution by themselves. This is one of the major factors that made this demand-driven project a success and solicited great commitment from community leaders. This clearly indicated that successful community-based projects must be demand-driven and

fully supported by, at least, a significant number of community members. Initially a common problem should be identified to unify heterogeneous urban community.

Another very positive aspect of the approach was the realization that successful community involvement requires a Community-Based Organization (CBO) that would be the entry point to the community and will facilitate community mobilization. This led to the formation of a Community Development Committee (CDC) which played a significant role in the implementation process. Today the CDC represents capacity within the community to further continue addressing infrastructure needs. In addition, attempts were made in the initial stages of the project to have this community as representative as possible although with limited success. The effort to have a representative committee is commendable and very important in starting a Community-Based Programme where community members have not been involved in similar activities.

The formation of a CDC eventually led to the formation of a Community-Based Organization (CBO) which though facing a number of problems represents an attempt to organize the community and have a legal entity. The existence of this CBO made it easier for interested donors to be involved in the project because they could directly be approached or approach the communities through the CDC.

Efforts to give the CDC power to both control the decision making process and some finances went a long way in empowering the CDC and strengthening their commitment and ownership of the project. Trusting communities with funds management, though risky at times, indicated the trust and confidence of donors in the community and also created a sense of responsibility for these funds. This represents a positive attempt to empower communities to control their development agenda. This was further complemented by setting funds aside for community mobilization and training. All these aspects are very important in building the capacity of the community to participate and also mobilize other community members.

Although the above discussed efforts were innovative and played a significant part in ensuring success of the project there were a few shortcomings which needed to be addressed to increase the impact of the project. These are outlined in the following section.

### **3.2 The Process of Mobilization**

The Process of mobilization has started after positive response was received from the UNDP and donor communities that they are considering to undertake the implementation of a community based project. A follow-up meeting with representatives from ILO, Zonal Director and 87 Ten-Cell community representatives was set up. This meeting resolved to establish a Community Development Committee. Following this discussion the area was divided into six zones and each zone elected a member to represent them in the CDC. The elected members however only included men and other two elections had to be done to ensure that women were represented. The requirement by the donors to include women representatives in the CDC was particularly commendable as most women tended to be ignored in such projects and thus jeopardizing their participation. The requirement to include women also reiterated the importance of ensuring full representation in spite of traditional practices that further marginalized participation of certain groups in the community.

After the selection of the CDC, the group was introduced to other donors and the process of mobilization started. This was initially done through the Councilor of the area and Ward Secretary who are outside members of CDC. This first attempt to elect leaders was followed by some public meetings that are said to have been not well attended. For about one and half year this mobilization was done but seemingly yielded little result. This is clearly demonstrated by the lack of interest among some community members who claim not to have known enough about the project to get involved. It is also not clear how

the mobilization was done given the need for very clear messages in the implementation process. The committee members indicated that they informed the community on the fact that the project was about to start and the fact that they will be required to participate. It is possible that due to previous negative experience with aid projects this message was not received. A lot of promises had been made to the community and nothing was forthcoming and it is possible that the community did not take CDC members seriously. This is compounded by limited expertise in community mobilization and organization in most countries and particularly in Tanzania where no similar urban program had taken place before.

This fact underscores the need for continuous community mobilization and especially after the start of the implementation process. There is also a need to select leaders who are representative and can go back to the community and solicit for support of the project. This was especially important given the fact that the idea of the project came from a few concerned leaders who had not necessarily discussed it with the community members. Thus although the community had a shared flooding problem it was still important for them to be sensitized on the project, select their leaders and methods of operation and identify other needs. It was also important at that time to specify the different roles and responsibilities of different actors. This would have been a very important step as expectations from donors and communities are different. This process would have ensured community support and ownership of the project from the beginning. Understanding of roles of different actors would have minimized conflicts experienced later in the project.

Another important aspect which needed adequate preparation was the formation of the CBO. This was important for this project given the lack of experience on forming urban CBOs in the country. There was also no legal structure for such organization and learning by doing has been a rewarding, however, a difficult process. The Hanna Nassif pilot project therefore provided the necessary experience and should be used in future projects so as to avoid the mistakes made. It is therefore necessary to give adequate time for these organizations to be formed and leaders need adequate training. This is particularly important given the fact that Hanna Nassif project has stimulated formation of other CBOs in Dar es Salaam which are interested in learning from this experience and addressing their infrastructure needs.

### **3.3 Approach to Community, Needs Assessment and Prioritization**

Efforts were made to include existing leaders right from the beginning. This was mainly done by calling a meeting of interested parties including cell leaders. This was followed by a decision to divide the settlement into six areas. This process indicates a considerable effort to involve the community in selecting their leaders. The effectiveness of this process was however affected by some unforeseen problems like the advent of multi-parties. For example most of the elected leaders belonged to the one existing political party at the time. The identification of the program with the then political leaders jeopardized involvement of the community members who later chose to be involved in other parties. Thus some of the leaders lost credibility because of their previous political affiliation and yet they continue to be part of the CDC. This underlines the importance of having a diversified team of community representatives who represent different community interests including the youth, women and religious leaders.

An important aspect of approaching communities is to send consistent messages on the project. This was not always the case in Hanna Nassif where project interpretation was varied. For example, a clear message that seemed to have distorted the image of the project was the fact that donor funding was available without indicating community responsibility. This was compounded by the raised community expectations by some of the donors. For example, the community was promised a Food for Work Program which was to start at the same time with the implementation process. The program indicated that voluntary labor would be compensated with food. This program was never implemented, however it greatly increased suspicion and affected community contribution, especially in form of labor.

Community members could not understand why some of the donors are paying for work, while the other require contribution from the community. Some of the members of the community could not understand why they have to contribute to one project while the other one was offering payment for their work.

Another important aspect in the process of community mobilization was the assessment of needs and prioritization. Although attempts were made to include the wide community, this was largely done by the CDC and also as a result of a baseline study which indicated priority problems as floods and access. They rightly chose the most acute and visible problem in the settlement namely the issue of flooding and roads. Although this was a right starting point, due to lack of adequate community mobilization, community members not directly affected by this problem were uninterested. There was also lack of interest among some residents who were experiencing flooding because they did not understand why construction of drains started in another area and not in their own. This experience underscores the need for a wider community needs assessment and prioritization. The challenges that this process would have had to deal with in Hanna Nassif was the previous experiences in community projects where members paid their contributions but the projects could not be implemented and funds misappropriated.

Community mobilization was further hampered by inadequate definition of 'Community'. Reference to Community mainly meant CDC and these were only representatives. Ideas of CDC therefore influenced the main decisions since no appropriate mechanism to consult or give feedback to the Community existed. This limited definition of Community through representation later became an issue as some of the community members felt that their interests were not considered. The problem was compounded by division within CDC members as this made some of the CDC members to speak negatively about the project. Definition of community should therefore include the entire community and not only representatives because opinion sometimes differ and there is need to arrive at a consensus. Lack of consensus is common in urban communities where the sense of community is very weak. Community mobilization and organization is therefore necessary as there is need to establish mechanisms that ensures mobilization and participation.

Seemingly the issue of 'representation' was given more emphasis than mobilizing the wider community to participate in the project. Instead of sensitizing the community about the project and discuss the problems with different community members, meetings were held with the then political party representatives and decisions made without the wider community being involved. Some of the CDC members were rather co-opted or picked randomly to fill in the gaps especially those representing women. By the time some of the community members knew what was happening leaders had been elected and implementation was underway.

This was further complicated by a history of the political party and cooperative leaders collecting development funds from the community and not implementing the said development. Hanna Nassif people had a bad experience of community contribution when Mwito Housing Cooperative (MHC) squandered funds contributed by the people for housing construction. It was also learnt that some of the leaders of MHC got elected and included in the CDC, a situation which demoralized people to pay their contribution.. Therefore it had created a history of lack of trust from community members who had no reason to believe that the new leaders will do what they said. This was further compounded by the powers given to the CDC which according to some community members were not elected by them. The involvement of CDC in handling finances was misunderstood and many community members eventually lost interest in the project and did not attend whatever meetings and workshops that were called.

### **3.4 Community Mobilization Structure**

**Efforts to mobilize the communities were supported by animators mainly from ILO and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). The role of UNV was to support the communities to mobilize, identify**

needs, establish a sense of ownership and thus increase their bargaining power with public authorities and promote local initiative through community volunteering and networking. For UNV to play this role effectively, there was a need to assign staff conversant with the local situation. One also needed to understand the culture of the local people as this affects mobilization and participation. Such post should have been filled in by nationals if possible. This certainly affected the mobilization process since some of the staff did not understand the local culture and language. Apparently the engagement of foreign animators to mobilize people was perhaps one of the cause for the failures in this aspect. Given the lack of experience and animation in urban areas their input in guiding the process was very critical. It is worth noting that ILO had employed a local animator who worked closely together with the UNV animators but both of them being under the supervision of the Project Coordinator. It seems that the local community animators had limited experience and knowledge of mobilizing urban communities. This coupled with the misunderstanding of the role of different organizations in community mobilization also weakened the mobilization process.

Apart from community mobilization, the project was successful to motivate community members along the road and the drains that were under constructions. This campaign was carried out by the CDC and community animators who reached agreement with the members on sensitive issues like new alignment of the infrastructure. This mobilization played a significant role in minimizing conflict and ensuring involvement of the people affected. The process also gave the technical staff an opportunity to address community problems and hence built capacity of technical staff who hardly had any experience in working with communities. The process also ensured construction of drains without demolition of structures which would have been both expensive and a point of conflict for affected households. Involvement of technical staff in the whole process gave a chance to develop their skills in community works. Given the magnitude of unplanned settlements this process has created some capacity to address infrastructure problems affecting over 70% of the population in the city. However, it is worth noting that this is a time-consuming exercises.

In addition the responsibilities of a newly formed CDC were also too many and this made it hard for the CDC to concentrate on mobilization while the project was at the same time being implemented. The CDC was for example, supposed to act as "a bridge" between the residents, City Council, donors and to mobilize the community resources for project financing, express the residents needs and priorities in the planning process. The CDC was also to ensure the coordinated involvement of the residents in the construction of infrastructure and lastly, be responsible for infrastructure investment and maintenance. The above mentioned expectation of the CDC to perform all these duties and still mobilize community was a very difficult task for an inexperienced CDC. Considerable time of the CDC was spent on finding out how the system works to make the project a success. They were learning by doing - a real challenge without anything to follow. In addition they had many actors views to take into consideration and the division of leadership.

All these factors were complicated by lack of information dissemination and the increasing power of the CDC which led to a poorly mobilized community. It is therefore worth noting that apart from the impressive role played by CDC, the entire community's role and participation has been modest. This currently explains the lack of ownership of the project by some community members. This underscores the complex nature of urban communities and need to have both the expertise and time to deal with mobilization and participation.

### **3.5 Community Contributions**

Two types of contributions were expected from the community and this included contribution in cash or labor. In terms of cash the community was expected to raise Tshs. 8 million in cash or free

labor contributions as a 5 % match to donor support. However to date only Tshs. 540,000 have been raised and a significant portion of this is said to have been raised from donations of visitors to the project.

The other form of contribution was through participation in meetings and workshops. No allowances were paid and the CDC members contributed a considerable amount of their time to meetings and planning sessions<sup>4</sup>. However in practice only the CDC and a group of women contributed this kind of labour by volunteering their time to hold meetings and clean the side drains. The reasons for lack of contribution by all the residents reflect weak community mobilization and thus lack of ownership of the project which threatens its sustainability. Other reasons for lack of contributions include the following:

- Although the issue of community participation was mentioned at the beginning of the project, no efforts were made to ensure community contributions. Contributions collection started nearly at the end of project because of inherent problems explained in the community. This is also the time when the CDC formed a fund raising committee and started asking people to contribute to the project. This raised suspicion since most of the people held the opinion that there were adequate donor funds. The community had also a history of leaders collecting fund and misappropriating it - a fact which further weakened community contribution.
- Lack of transparency of the CDC in their operations was evidenced by lack of streamlined methods of payment for work done. This was particularly the case at the initial stages where CDC members got paid more than others for the same amount of work. This led to mistrust of CDC and therefore mitigating against any efforts of mobilizing the community to contribute to the project. This aspect underlines the need for transparency in all matters and especially in regard to finances where equal pay is mandatory for equal work. This however raises the issue of CDC's voluntary contribution. There is need in the future for benefiting communities to recognize the contribution of their leaders in one way. This is however only possible if the community is cohesive and done with community and not donor funding.
- Lack of transparency by CDC on financial matters. So far the community has not been informed about the financial resources of the project and how this money has been utilized. This has led to suspicion since some of the funds are fully controlled by CDC. Further, the division among CDC members has led to spreading unfounded rumors indicating that funds have been misappropriated.
- Inadequate information dissemination between CDC and the community which has been aggravated by the rumors being spread mainly by the opposing group the consequences of which have been accounted for the little response in community contributions.
- The low community response in contributing could also be due to the wrong definition of the community and their needs. The fact that the flooding problem is not experienced or not felt at the same magnitude by all residents excludes many of them from enthusiastically contributing to construction of storm water drains.
- Contribution is also affected by division within CDC where some of the members are currently suspended.

Updated by BC. Approved by SR. Last update: 31 March, 1998.



## *Evaluation of Hanna Nassif community based urban upgrading project phase I, cont.*

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### 4.0 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION



Construction of the main storm water drain by gabions



Completed murrum road

#### **4.1 Adequacy of Project Design, Preparatory Work, Reporting and Management**

As described earlier, the evaluation mission considers that the project design was logical and correct, but underestimated the difficulties of dealing with new urban communities. The implementation team was indulgent by accepting to work with incomplete designs and fluctuating technical staff. The fact that

Hanna Nassif project was implemented by the community, a stage by stage design and construction process which aimed at training the community in simple design and construction techniques was followed. It is factual that from traditional project management point of view, the fluctuating technical staff and lack of comprehensive designs resulted into delays, reconstruction of weak structures and increase in the construction costs. However, it is worth noting here that if the objective of training in skills of the local community was to be achieved, the adoption of traditional project management was likely to overshadow this objective. The ILO engineering consultant who worked closely together (although very irregular) with the community and counter part national engineer, facilitated the preparation of a training manual to local '*fundis*'<sup>5</sup> and the community at large. The need for establishing adaptive forms of design and construction techniques for both the local community and the traditional project management seems to be apparent.

It was important that the project team prepared and maintained detailed budget, financial plans, engineering cost estimates and comparisons on the basis of which the implementation could have been managed and community contracts awarded. At the time of the evaluation, it was still not possible to analyze costs and labour inputs due to lack of consolidated data. It was understood that an ILO Consultant will have to prepare these in the next few weeks.

There were regular Steering Committee Meetings chaired by the City Director who was also the Project Director. This procedure was later interrupted because there were frequent changes in the city leadership (City Directors). It became less frequent but the meetings continued until the end of the first phase of the project i.e. in August 1996. Besides Steering Committee Meetings, the project had several Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review meeting.

Every week there were TST and CDC meetings to review the progress of the project. There was therefore weekly, monthly and quarterly progress reports which were prepared by the TST up to October 1996. Also minutes of the CDC meetings addressing the progress of the project have been well documented.

#### **4.2 Efficiency of Institutional Arrangement for Project Implementation**

The general institutional arrangement seems to have been operating efficiently with a coordinatory mechanism which was facilitated by the Steering Committee, Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review Meeting. Each Agency played its role as was foreseen in the project document with the exception of some few incidences as elaborated in section 5.2

#### **4.3 Justification and Relevance of the Objectives**

The project document addressed one of the most acute problems of Hanna Nassif namely flooding. Due to constraints of the economy, the Government was unable to upgrade and alleviate poverty in the area and several other unplanned settlements. Considering the magnitude of the problems it also realized that it will not be able to solve these problems alone. The concept of empowering local communities to participate in construction of their most needed infrastructure seemed to be one of the most realistic alternatives of upgrading unplanned settlements. For this reason, community participation in infrastructure construction has been a realistic objective in Hanna Nassif project and will also be so for a long time in other similar projects in the country.

The Government has recognized the potential of community involvement and presently, this approach is being expanded to other settlements on the basis of preliminary results of Hanna Nassif. Similarly the concept of community involvement in settlement upgrading has been well incorporated in the Urban

Development Policy(1995) as pointed out in section 1.1.2. The project objectives were also strongly supported by several International Agencies and Donors.

#### 4.4 Achievement of Objectives

The **development objective** of the project was defined as *improved living conditions and expanded employment opportunities in urban settlements in Dar es Salaam*. The project largely achieved this objective. The project also supported the Government's policy as expressed in its Economic and Social Adjustment Programme which recommends the upgrading of infrastructure services, efficient mobilization of domestic resources and enhanced people's participation in the operation and maintenance.

Although no data was available to indicate the reduction of water -borne diseases, it was imperative that such improved infrastructure and especially in drainage leads to reduction of water-borne diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera and bilharzia. This should also improve the community health, reduce medical bills and thus increase potential savings. The household solid waste removal program managed by women groups contribute to better health conditions in Hanna Nassif. Similarly, there are household savings from reduced house repairs inflicted by annual floods. Improved accessibility has promoted commercial activities in the area where micro-enterprise activities are evident. Improved environmental conditions have also increased and stimulated improved land values and housing market in the settlement.

The **intermediate objective** was specified as the contribution to the achievement of the development objective *to demonstrate the feasibility of community-based approach to urban settlement up-grading*. The project achieved also this objective since the implementation of Phase I of Hanna Nassif through community management and contracts is a proof of the feasibility of the approach. The experience gained so far has been largely contributing to the improvement of other projects in Dar es Salaam city.

With regard to three **immediate objectives** the achievements were as follows:

**The immediate objective 1:** *A pilot project on community-based, employment intensive storm water drainage infrastructure up-grading of the Hanna Nassif informal settlement; creating in turn the capacity within Dar es Salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives*. The project and the inexperienced community were particularly successful to achieve this immediate objective by producing; **Output 1:** *A functioning and maintainable storm water and other basic infrastructure services improved to good technical standards*. The work was carried out by broad community participation and by using labour-intensive methods, community contracts and through the management of the CDC and the Technical Support Team. A total of 600 metres of main storm water channel, 1500 metres of side drain and 1000 meters of murram road have been constructed. The details of physical progress of the project have been explained under section 4.5. Similarly, training materials like videos, construction and maintenance guidelines and plans were prepared as was foreseen in the project document.

**Output 2:** *Employment created, in the magnitude of about 15,000 workdays of paid and 5,000 workdays of community contribution*. The project achieved the employment creation above this target i.e. 24,430 being 4,430 work days above the target. Of the created work days 65% constituted of man-days and 35%. women-days. Basically all construction work was carried out by using labour-based methods under community contracts The cost for the created work days was Tshs. Tshs 36.920.887. Unskilled laborers were paid about Tshs. 800/= while skilled laborers received Tshs. 1600/= a day. The project was also successful in training community members in construction skills, technical and legal aspects of community contracts, accounting and storekeeping. It was however, less successful in training community groups supposedly to be established as petty contractors at a later date. This was beyond the

financial and technical capability of the project, and thus an over-optimistic target.

**Output 3:** *A community management capacity to maintain the infrastructure constructed, coordinate its own physical development standards, and identify future priority needs.* The project prepared maintenance training materials and trained selected people through the actual construction works, workshops and seminars. Although the "10% maintenance fund" was available for the CDC, the project could not yet start the maintenance program. This will remain a priority task of the Phase II. On the other hand, the project could launch needed secondary activities, like waste removal through the establishment of active women's groups and a feasibility study for waste recycling. These programmes should be strengthened and expanded.

**The immediate objective 2:** *The capacity for the Dar es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner to community-based urban up-grading proposals be created and expanded.* The achievements were as follows:

**Output 1:** *A Technical working group trained in community-based up-grading.* There were difficulties to obtain the right seconded technical personnel from the DCC for the elaboration of designs and plans. It took also a long time to assign a survey team to the Kinondoni Zonal Office. However, a series of group meetings were held on Hanna Nassif by the SDP working group on unplanned settlements and other NGOs engaged in settlement up-grading activities. By this, a group of experts has been developed and trained in the concept.

**Output 2:** *A Training Manual giving step by step guidelines for replication of the process in other settlements prepared.* Although a manual as such was not prepared, but the project produced regular reports which were disseminated to and discussed with interested parties. The findings were extensively used in formulation of projects in the pipeline at the time of the evaluation by other agencies and donors.

**Output 3:** *A report on the impact of the project so as to avoid harmful effects during preparation and implementation of future proposals.* See output 4 below.

**Output 4:** *A survey report written identifying the next 10 unplanned settlements for replication.* Seven unplanned settlements were selected as priority project areas under the World Bank funded Community Infrastructure Programme. In these projects, the Hanna Nassif experience was widely used. Furthermore, Ardhi Institute prepared a socio-economic study on Hanna Nassif which is also being used by DCC Technical Staff under the SDP. The positive elements of Hanna Nassif are being adopted in other donor supported projects.

**The immediate objective 3:** Targeted a *support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni settlements, involving a network of community volunteers.* The project has experienced great difficulties in achieving this target. The obstacles are described under section. 3.3 in details. Several activities foreseen under outputs 2 and 3 are left for Phase II. The modest achievement is rather due to the over-optimistic project design than to the project team. It will, in all probability, take long time, until the culture of community ownership will be developed.

#### *4.4.1 Relationship Between Objectives, Outputs and Inputs*

The evaluation mission evidenced that the project document followed a logical design with regard of objectives and outputs, but it grossly underestimated the time and special expertise required to motivate communities, particularly to raise and collect community contributions and develop ownership spirit. It also underestimated the engineering inputs needed for preparation and implementation. However, considering the total budget of Phase I, the achievement so far, particularly the physical output was considerable and very positive. The project design should have foreseen activities going over to the

Phase II. This is now one of the priority task of the University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (UCLAS), the implementing agency of the second phase, namely to identify those activities which should continue.

#### 4.4.2 Beneficiaries

The population of Hanna Nassif are the primary beneficiaries of the project through the important infrastructure services created which improve living and health conditions in the settlement. The construction work created direct employment and income for community members, while the future operation and maintenance of the services will provide additional employment. The community also learned to identify, organize and manage such projects, handle technical and financial matters of the operation. Another beneficiary is the City Councils which, through secondment of staff to the project learned important experience on community managed settlement upgrading works. Future settlements will also benefit from the unique experience of Hanna Nassif.

Future community mobilizers and NGOs will benefit as well from both the positive and negative experience of the project when being trained in different aspects of community motivation and participation.

#### 4.5 Physical Progress Made

The physical progress made until 31<sup>st</sup> August 1996 is summarized in table 4.1 below;

**Table 4.1 Physical Progress Made as at 31st August 1996**

| SR NO | PLANNED ACTIVITY   | IMPLEMENTATION STATUS  | ESTIMATED % ACHIEVEMENT | REMARKS  |
|-------|--|--|-------------------------|--|
| 1.    | 2.5 Km murrum road with lined drains                           | 1.0 Km Murrum road with side drains (lined) constructed.                         | 40%                     | Special maintenance arrangement is needed before the road starts to erode. |
| 2.    | 1.5 Km lined drains  | 1.5 Km side drains and 0.6 km main drain.  | 80%                     | Main drain is almost completed.  |
| 3.    | 1.5 Km of improved footpath                                    | about 0.7 Km along the main drain and at the end of road No. 1 has been improved | 50%                     |  |
| 4.    | 11 protected points for drainage discharge into Msimbazi Creek | 2 major protected outlet constructed.  | --                      | Dependent on the revisions made in the plans.                              |
| 5.    | 10 road drifts   | More than 10 constructed   | 100%                    | More provision because of the change of design.                            |
| 6.    | 15 footpath culverts   | 10 vehicular culverts crossing main drain and road No. 1 have been constructed.  | 65%                     | Changed to cater for vehicular access.                                     |
| 7.    | Scour protection to existing gullies in the settlement         | Gabions provided instead   | 100%                    |  |

The overall quality of the work, particularly that of the drains is acceptable (with some exceptions) and

considerably better than what one would expect from inexperienced community labor. **The created infrastructure is functional, maintainable and serves the purposes.**

#### 4.6 Problems Encountered and Corrections Made

Despite the positive achievements in the physical progress of developing phase I of this project, there were few problems encountered during the implementation process and where necessary corrections made. These included the following:

- The project underestimated the need for comprehensive designs of both road and drainage channels. It seems the engineering design were made piece by piece concurrent with the construction stage. While the aim might have been to provide flexibility in the construction stages but this did not exempt the need of preparing comprehensive designs through which amendments could have been made. Subsequently due to lack of adequate supervision, some sections of the drain was to be demolished and reconstructed. COWI-consult was later on called to make some supervision of the construction and documentation of the designs.
- Some engineering components were also not or partially considered despite their significance in infrastructure works. For example laboratory soil tests, thickness and capacity of the road base and road design were given partial significance in such a construction work.
- Seemingly, the CDC and the TST who were deciding which type of work should be carried out and by who underestimated some of these inputs mainly in belief that they can be done without hiring a consultant or contractor. This brought some implementation problems which necessitated the need of engaging COWI- Consult to supervise the work.
- There are a few work items which still have to be completed. For example, hundreds of steel bars (10-40 cm long) are left standing out from the drain walls in very lengthy sections of the drain which may cause serious injuries to children and persons passing by. The walls of the open drain (some sections are 1.5 meter deep) do not have any uniform edges which would not only give a better engineering appearance to the drains, but protect people from slipping into the drain. The quality of the murram road is also to be improved.

#### 4.7 Construction Costs and Cost Effectiveness

The cost breakdowns are as follows:

|                        |                 |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| Equipment              | Tshs 3.907.750  |
| Survey instruments     | US\$ 14.976     |
| Tools                  | Not quantified  |
| Construction materials | Tshs 76.095.109 |
| Labour wages           | Tshs 36.920.887 |

The funds spent on labour wages represent the sum of about US\$ 60,000, or little bit less than 25% of the total investment costs. This could indicate that the program was relatively less "labour-intensive" and more material intensive due to high cost of the reinforced concrete main drain. However the project can be classified as a labour based project as all work has been carried out by manual labour using hand

tools (the use of a concrete mixer is the only exception). This is also shown in the costs of equipment and tools which were very modest. Although final cost breakdowns are still not yet established, and no tender was organized which would allow comparison, it seems that the construction through community contracts was higher than COWI Consultants cost estimate. This may be due to the inexperience of the community to use labour and materials according to work standards, and the difficulty to organize construction works in a densely built-up area. The higher costs were also due to the urgency work measures, like working longer hours, as well as on Saturdays and Sundays, in order to complete the main drain as much as possible in the dry season. The main drain was partly constructed during the rainy season necessitating some of the works to be repeated. The devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling for the money which was budgeted in US\$ but released at later dates also contributed a reduction in the total available budget for construction costs (Refer to table 1.1).

In principle, community contracts are exempt of taxes, and exclude overhead costs and profit, they should therefore be more cost effective than private contractors' works.

On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that the project was implemented within the approved original budget and within reasonable time.

The project management did not prepare cost estimates and comparisons. For this reason it was not possible for the evaluation mission to analyze cost-effectiveness from the existing data. Based on consultations with Engineering Consultants, the evaluation team was of the opinion that the construction costs were on the higher side. The conclusion is based on the unit costs of infrastructure which is in the case of storm water drain was about US\$ 250 per metre, and that of road, about US\$ 48,000 per kilometre. Particularly the cost of the road was high. The greatest part of the investment was spent on materials and transport of cement, steel bars, timber and gravel. As mentioned earlier, one of the reason of the higher cost was certainly that all the works including procurement being carried out by an inexperienced CDC and unskilled workers under community contracts. The problems encountered at the beginning of the project which resulted into delays in the construction process also contributed to higher costs. Although the final quality is acceptable and the infrastructure is durable and maintainable, some of the work items, should have been done better if constant engineering input and experience in community managed projects was available.

The evaluation mission team underlines that the CDC, despite the described short-comings made a good job in producing the physical output.

#### **4.8 Community Contracting and Labour Based Methods**

The implementation methodology was through Community Construction Contracts (CCC). It was the CDC which, with the assistance of the TST, identified sub-projects, priorities and approved engineering designs. On the basis of bills of quantities for materials, the CDC awarded contracts for community members who executed the contracts. The CDC's Construction Committee took full responsibility for the supervision of the procurement, organization of voluntary and hired labor, construction activities and quality control. Of course the technical personnel largely assisted and guided the process which was community based in real terms. It should be underlined that the strong determination of the community to undertake all possible construction was the driving force behind the success of constructing the infrastructure. The evaluation mission, however noted also that the decision of the CDC to keep all contracts for community execution was a commanding act, but it overestimated the technical capabilities of the community and it resulted in problems in the construction (quality and costs). In the next phase it is advisable to make a clear distinction between works which can be implemented through community contracts and works which could be better carried out by labour-based contractors.

## 4.9 Training Programmes, Materials and Activities

Training programmes involved on job training to participating Masons, Carpenters and unskilled people. Seminars and workshops to both CDC and the people (beneficiaries) were also conducted. A study tour to Kenya and Uganda for some CDC members to visit similar projects has been planned and organized within the training programme. One Financial Clerk and a Stores Assistant have been trained to manage financial matters, procurement and storage of materials.

A total of 8 workshops were agreed upon including community awareness workshop, construction workshop, project implementation, CDC, community group identification, income generation and community evaluation. Five workshops were concentrating on construction and maintenance skills of the drains and road.

Substantial amount of training materials have been made available to the CDC. They include manuals, reports, consultancy reports, policy papers, books and booklets, maps, photographs, bulletins, newsletters and journals. A few of these materials have been translated into Swahili for use of the CDC members and the rest of Hanna Nassif people. Besides the above, the SDP had video-filmed the project for both documentation and training purposes.

### *4.9.1 Relevance of the Training Materials Produced to the Needs of the Target Group*

Many of the training materials have been written in English which might not be very useful to the common people who do not understand the language. However, for the skilled and learned people the materials produced will be used as reference and training inputs in construction skills. The audio and visual materials such as photographs and video films also provide an asset for training the people within Hanna Nassif.

## 4.10 Improved Planning Capacity of the Communities

**By the end of the first Phase, the Community and the CDC (despite their internal differences) gained experience and demonstrated true capabilities to address infrastructure needs of Hanna Nassif. It is commendable that the community organized and maintained the present alignment of the infrastructure which crossed through private lands and properties without demolition and compensation. It also recruited community labour. It was also capable of planning and executing all sequences of the construction, from planning through procurement to construction, which is a difficult task even for an experienced contractor. The CDC grew up to this task and proved that communities can complement city authorities by undertaking several responsibilities of infrastructure development in their respective settlements.**

## 4.11 Capacity Building of Relevant Government Institutions and Extent to Which the Concept has Been Accepted by Other Community Groups

**This objective was specifically targeted to the City Commission by involving its staff in the project so as to acquire more skills and experience in similar undertakings. The secondment of the city engineer, planners and a surveyor was a good approach to this endeavor. But the entire participation of Planners and the Engineer and the insufficient number of the seconded staff to the project does not guarantee that adequate capacity has been built to respond to the magnitude of problems of unplanned settlements at the city level. Additional inputs are still required to involve more DCC staff in other projects planned under the CIP so as to comprehend other community needs. However, for smaller projects similar to that of Hanna Nassif the capacity developed is a**

## **potential that can be utilised to solve problems in other settlements**

**In general, the project was successful in involving a large number of National Agencies and Institutions, as recommended in the project document. The progress of the project got wide media presentation. The Ardhi Institute (now UCLAS), one of the competent technical bodies of the country has been continuously engaged in studying and analyzing the project, while the City Council and International Agencies used and referred to the experience of Hanna Nassif in their new projects. Many of the responsible technical staff of these institutions are well informed of results and different aspects of the project. No doubt, Hanna Nassif became the reference of many other national project proposals.**

**The concept of community based infrastructure improvement has been widely accepted by the local communities as evidenced by the establishment of about 10 CBOs city wide. The establishment of these CBOs stems from the government failure to deliver services to the people. While the establishments of these CBOs started mainly in the 1990s, the pace at which they have emerged is a clear manifestation of acute infrastructure deficiency in unplanned settlements. It also reflects peoples' trust on CBOs and the common understanding that the Local Authorities can no longer reach the people at grassroots level.**

**As regards to Hanna Nassif, the establishment of the CDC was a good starting point despite its operational and organizational problems. The establishment of the CDC also motivated the establishment of women groups which have been working hand in hand with the CDC in the cleaning of the constructed drains. It was also observed that there exist a youth group which is yet to be registered. The Women and Youth groups have been undertaking specific issue based activities for environmental improvement and poverty alleviation.**

**As pointed out above (refer section 1.1.2), the Government, particularly the MLHUD incorporated community participation as a component in the Draft Urban Development policy of 1995 and the 1993 National Land Policy. This is a recognition of CBO efforts and the role they are playing to upgrade their settlements.**

**The provision of permit to the CDC to collect revenue from road toll for Hanna Nassif by the City Commission is also an understanding or acceptability of this concept from the Urban Local Authority point of view. It is in line with the idea of delegating responsibilities and powers to the grassroots CBOs. Possibilities also exist for the DCC to grant permit to the CDC to collect revenue from other sources so as to supplement revenue collected from road toll and enable the Community maintain the laid down infrastructure.**

### **4.12 Capacity and Effectiveness of the CDC to Implement the Project, Motivate and Mobilize the Community**

**The CDC was successful in mobilizing the community for the physical work and in constructing the infrastructure as well as handling project accounts. It demonstrated also initiatives and drive in contracting and mobilizing national agencies and donors. It was able to get recognition as the representative of the community. On the other hand, the CDC was not successful in motivating the community to contribute and undertake maintenance work due to described problems within the community (see section 3.5). It is the Phase II which has to carry out the required changes in the CDC and introduce an appropriate methodology on community mobilization.**

### **4.13 Role of the Three UN Agencies (ILO, UNCHS, UNV) and Lessons Learnt**

As explained in section 2.1, the role of each of these agencies was quite exemplary and efficient. However, a more extensive coordination was required from the part of the UNDP to streamline some of the misunderstanding which arose from the side of the UNV as pointed out in section 5.2

#### 4.14 Sustainability

##### *4.14.1 Operation and Maintenance Arrangements*

Occasional cleaning of the canal has been carried out. The women groups have been cleaning the channels after completion of the construction works. The 'new CDC' should rely and extend the activities of these groups. More residents should be mobilized to make regular cleaning and small maintenance on the section of the infrastructure which passes through, or is in front of their properties. Unfortunately, regular organized maintenance has not been started so far which is one of the set-backs of the project. It is imperative that routine and periodic maintenance works start without delay because several sections of the infrastructure, particularly that of the road show signs of deterioration. The CDC already possesses a considerable amount of money (i.e. Tshs 540,000) for this purposes and funds originated from the 10% of the donors' financed construction costs. Therefore the immediate financial input is available. Community contribution so far is unimportant. The launching of a viable maintenance system remains therefore the priority task of the second phase.

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## 5.0 LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS



**Completed murram roads and side drains. Side drains show lack of maintenance**



**The lessons drawn from Phase I of Hanna Nassif Community Based Urban Upgrading Project have been summarized as follows;**

### **5.1 Potentials Inherent in the Project**

- (i) The establishment of a functioning CDC which managed to make decisions and close supervision of the day to day activities of the project is a positive sign that the project can be successfully carried forward to phase II with some minor corrections.**
- (ii) The knowledge gained by the CDC members on the overall community, and project set-up, their roles and responsibility, the training in skills (e.g. store keeping and managing the accounts) and labour based construction techniques are potential gains that can be utilized in future operation and maintenance of the project.**
- (iii) The fact that more than 86% of the houses within Hanna Nassif are owner occupied, provide a chance of positive participation of residents if proper mobilization and trust is instilled among community members.**
- (iv) The constructed drains and roads are assets that the CDC can utilize to generated funds for the operation and maintenance and creation of jobs to residents of the area. Other benefit accruing from the project is the increase in land value and growth of petty trading and other home based enterprises.**
- (v) The project will continue to be a good example for Community Based Settlement Upgrading and therefore, it should be supported so as to achieve the desired objectives.**
- (vi) Community participation was observed to exist at two levels. The first one is the part being played by the CDC and the second one is the part played by the wider Community. At CDC level, there is no doubt that they tried their best to make the project a success despite its shortcomings. The CDC managed to work together with the Donor and Executing Agencies, the DCC, the TST and to some extent with the wider Community of Hanna Nassif. This task has never been done by any CBO in this country. On the part of the Community, they tried to participate wherever**

requested but as elaborated under section 3.0 the process of mobilization and building a community still calls for additional time to cultivate a sense of belonging and responsibility to community managed projects.

(vii) The TST constituted of personnel from the Executing Agencies and seconded staff from the DCC. The execution of Hanna Nassif project have exposed several members of the TST on how to deal with the problems within the local communities. As a pilot project, the knowledge gained by these members provide an asset in adapting similar approaches to other unplanned settlements of Dar es Salaam and the country at large.

## 5.2 Problems and Constraints

Despite of the achievements that have been registered in phase I of the project, there were several problems that hindered the achievement of the project objectives as summarized below;

- (i) Technical aspects particularly the comprehension of engineering design was not adequately addressed in beginning of the project. Although the approach was an attempt to involve the community in the design and construction stages, it was undermined by inadequate construction and supervisory work as compounded by the engineer who abandoned the project. The designs, supervision and other components like soil tests, comprehensive survey, etc. lacked in the beginning stage of the project.
- (ii) The role of the CDC in the project was somehow over-emphasized. This created a sense of being able to deliver technical works which otherwise were above the capabilities and experience of the CDC.
- (iii) The inter-Agency and multi-donor sponsored project execution provided a good experience on how co-ordination can collectively contribute to alleviating poverty, improving the living environment and generating employment. But somehow, the donor-specific objectives in provision of support slowed down the implementation process of the project.
- (iv) There were some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the project document which led to duplication of responsibilities. For instance while the project had already recruited the Project Coordinator and Animator for more than six months from the start of the project, the UNV was also in belief to assign a UNV personnel with Project Coordinator tasks.
- (v) While the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) is the beneficiary of the project, its participation in the project through secondment of staff particularly the Town planners was rather erratic. Other staff members frequently abandoned their seconded positions. This problem contributed to delays in the implementation process of the project. Except for the engineer and a surveyor who were seconded to the project under the UNCHS contracts, it was revealed that there were no incentives which were paid to the Planners. To some extent, this provide explanation for their erratic participation in the project. In future projects this issue has to be resolved.
- (vi) The Steering Committee Meetings were irregular due to the frequent changes of the city Directors. As of November 1996, the project has had five different Project Directors. This phenomenon contributed to the interruption in the implementation process since the City Director is also a signatory of the CDC project accounts.
- (vii) The Evaluation Mission noted that there were two Steering Committees one for Community Infrastructure Programme (CIP) and the other one for Hanna Nassif Project. Both committees are

**being chaired by City Commission. In order to simplify coordination and concentrate effort, it would have been more practical to have only one Steering Committee. This would also have enhanced sharing and learning.**

**(viii) Community mobilization and participation is a long process. There was therefore a need to give adequate time to address different community issues and not assume that the commitment of the CDC was shared by other members of the community. This was particularly important given past community experiences on development projects where people were never consulted and their participation was only assumed.**

**(ix) The commitment and enthusiasm of the CDC was also mistaken to mean a cohesive community. This wrong assumption was based on the fact that similar activities had not taken place before. There is therefore need for community leadership development and organization - a factor that was taken for granted at the beginning because community leaders were assumed to represent all the interests of the community.**

**(x) Lack of experiences with formation, running and leadership of CBOs also contributed to this very complex situation. Similarly, inadequate community mobilization augmented further the problem of poor community participation.**

**(xi) Failures in community contribution hinges heavily on the extent to which mobilization and participation of the entire community was carried out. This, also reiterates the issue of inadequate representation of the wider community.**

**(xii) Historical development and culture of the people plays an important part in mobilization and participation. The residents of this area had already been mobilized for activities that never took place and were therefore skeptical about the whole process. Again this manifested itself in the poor response in contribution from the community.**

**(xiii) Previously the government had been the main provider of services and it took time for community members to see their role and hence the reluctance to participate. Enthusiasm of the CDC is however notable in bridging this barrier and proving their commitment to change the situation. This idea of volunteering to guide the process was not necessarily shared by the wider community - a factor that explains their "sitting back and waiting for things to happen" attitude. Immediate participation of donors without proper preparation perpetuated this dependency syndrome.**

**(xiv) Excessive donor contribution augmented the problem of residents' contribution thinking that funds were readily available.**

**(xv) Cost contribution for priority infrastructure needs as well as for operation and maintenance responsibilities should be agreed with participating CBOs from the outset of the project. This is considered necessary not only to establish a demand-driven program to ensure a sense of commitment and ownership but also to overcome the above mentioned distrust and, in the case of Hanna Nassif prevent donor dependency which eroded cost recovery mechanisms.**

**(xvi) Within the community leadership, there existed a division of opposing group, the 'Wasomi' (the educated) who thought that the CDC should be composed of the educated people and the 'Wasiosoma' (the non-educated) who incidentally, constitute the majority of the current CDC. While the Wasiosoma have been promoting participation, the Wasomi group has been against these efforts.**

**(xvii) The legal status of the CDC is still at stake in so far as the Hanna Nassif Community Development Association (HNCDA) amended constitution is yet to be registered. Efforts should be made to finalize this task so as to institute a legally established Association in the area.**

**(xviii) Whilst efforts were made to support the establishment of the CDC there was no community planning. Even during the construction phase of the main drain there was a low level of understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the various actors including individuals, households, as well as the CDC.**

**(xix) This clearly indicate the importance of transparency and clear definition of the problem facing a particular section of the community. Regular reporting on the community fund is crucial to win community trust. People would like to have access to decision making mechanism over contribution they pay. Thus the process of laying down principles of accountability and peoples involvement in the decision making process seems to be very basic for the realization of participation and willingness to contribute.**

**(xx) There are some minor works which are yet to be completed for security and convenient utilization of the drains by the residents as elaborated under section 4.6**

### **5.3 Recommendations**

**(i) The construction of the second phase is recommended to start on the basis of full surveys, complete engineering designs, bill of quantities and cost estimates. Works that can be done by the community and by contractors should be distinguished. COWI Consult design input may be used as a model.**

**(ii) "External" technical assistance like engineering designs, construction supervision and community mobilization should be sought from the previous Agencies which were involved as executing and /or associated Agencies in the project. Similarly, technical assistance may be sought from petty contractors (for those available) and consultants where the implementing agent may fall short of such services.**

**(iii) All engineering works should be completed in order to ensure proper functioning of the infrastructure and facilitate regular maintenance of the created assets. These works include, completion of the remaining section of the main drain, completion of the edge of the main drain, cutting the erecting steel bars and providing covers or protection walls where it was observed to be unsafe to children and night walks.**

**(iv) Coordination of upgrading programs at city level and dissemination of the Hanna Nassif experiences to facilitate learning should be ensured. This can be done by maintaining one Steering Committee for all upgrading projects.**

**(v) The explanation of the roles of the National Executing Agencies, the NIGP, DCC, UCLAS, CDC and supporting UN Agencies, the ILO, UNCHS and UNV need to be clearly defined from the very beginning of the second phase of the project.**

**(vi) The DCC should provide more support to the CDC activities through secondment of its qualified technical staff as it used to be in the first phase of the project. However, special remuneration and financial support should be provided to the team members seconded to the project. This will ensure their permanent attachment and gaining experience in community infrastructure upgrading works.**

(vii) The DCC should revise its legal aspects, responsibilities and powers so as to enable CDC undertake small upgrading activities in their localities and collect revenue for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure works. Property taxes, land rents, road tolls, user charges, may be partially or wholly collected by the CDC for the purpose of funding operational activities in their areas. Experience shows that revising DCC regulations and by-laws prove to be a time consuming exercise. In order to ease the process, interim procedures such as memoranda of agreement may be persuaded whereby the CDC enters into a compromise with the DCC in making collections of the taxes. It is recommended that the tax collection exercise using a CBO be pioneered in Hanna Nassif and if proved successful, a mechanism of adopting it to other parts of the city should be instituted.

(viii) Formation and strengthening of small groups within Hanna Nassif is very important. This will encourage such groups to address different issues. The approach in doing so may include the subdivision of Hanna Nassif settlement into smaller issue based community groups with cohesive force that will ease communication between the CDC and these groups. Such groups should elect their leaders who will represent them in the CDC. The community groups should be clearly defined both geographically and if possible socio-economically.

(ix) Future projects need to allocate more time and resources to community mobilization since it is an essential pre-requisite for any community based initiative. This is not simply to establish, strengthen, train and empower CBOs in their role as service coordinators, but additional inputs are required to overcome the major distrust that has been built up between CBOs and the administration over many years.

(x) Adequate community mobilization and planning will confirm grassroots priority needs, levels and standards of affordable service provision, resolve conflicting interests, agree upon optimal plan, strengthen local ownership and commitments, whilst paving the way for active CBO involvement in plan implementation. It is therefore recommended that in phase 2, emphasis should be put in mobilization and participation. For this, there is a need for trained staff who understand community mobilization, organization and participation. This is an issue that has to be spearheaded by local people who understand the dynamics of the communities involved. Technical personnel cannot be expected to perform this role and so are inexperienced community animators.

(xi) Development of community leadership and resolving of the current leadership wrangles must also be dealt with. This is particularly important given the fact that the current leadership is divided - a fact that jeopardizes the wider community involvement. There is a need for an impartial moderator to discuss the existing problems with the two groups and come out with a solution so as to come up with a smooth transition to elected representatives. Further it will be important to hold elections after the registration of the CBO. There is however, a need for communities to be sensitized on the whole process. The roles of leaders should be clearly discussed and allow the communities to select leaders that they can trust. The three year term of CDC members has elapsed. It is important to maintain continuity and not lose all the skills learned in the first phase. There is a need therefore, to retain at least one-third of the current CDC leadership. The current leadership division between the educated "*wasomi*" and the illiterate "*wasiosoma*" has to be resolved immediately because it threatens the smooth running of the project. For example, one group is promoting participation while another is de-motivating the community from involvement.

(xii) Future projects should insist on equal representation of men and women in development committees. The Hanna Nassif project set a good example in repeating elections in order to allow adequate representation of women. This is an issue that should not be left to community leaders

who mostly follow traditions that exclude women from the decision making process. The requirement to include women was particularly important because this is not traditionally a sector where women are automatically involved. Paid labor based construction has been a domain of men is well illustrated by the low participation of women at the beginning of the project. Their involvement later increased and by the end of the project their contribution constituted 35% of the total labor.

(xiii) Equal participation of women in both leadership and employment should also be ensured. Women groups who are involved in maintenance and provision of community services should be supported and trained. Young people of the settlement should have access to employment created by such projects. Extra efforts should be made to make the women and youths groups registered and cooperate with the CDC in both execution of the next phase of the project and the operation and maintenance of the already laid down infrastructure. By doing so, several projects can be executed within the community and the process of mobilizing the community will be simplified.

(xiv) The community contract system should continue and be improved in order to better address employment needs. There is also need for a revolving fund to enable communities to undertake other economic activities because temporary employment solves only a part of the problems. Initiation of new activities will be possible given the fact that the infrastructure services are already operational.

(xv) The launching of training to small / petty contractors at the preparatory stage of the second phase should be made possible under, or in cooperation with other such training centres to train selected community members in infrastructure design and construction skills.

(xvi) Community contribution should be given due consideration in the next phase. A special contribution mechanism should be instituted and effectively monitored. Transparency in both contributions, external support and expenditure of collected revenue should be instilled. Special expertise is required to support this activities, qualified national consultants and NGO's have to be invited to assist, and in case of lack of such expertise, special training programs should be organized for individuals and NGOs;

(xvii) The constitutions of the CDC's should be legally registered and existing ones revisited to reflect the current requirements of the local residents. Residents should participate in the making of constitution and subsequent revisions.

Dar es Salaam, May 1997

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PROJECT EVALUATION HANNA NASSIF

#### IMPROVING LIVING CONDITIONS AND EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN URBAN-LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES

##### I. Background information

**The project is part of an inter-agency program aimed at improving living conditions and expanding employment opportunities in low income settlements.**

**Hanna Nassif settlement is located in Kinondoni District, Dar Es Salaam. The area covers 44 and has a population of 19,000 people. In this settlement severe flooding occurs during the rainy season due to absence of drainage channels. The rainwater mixes with uncollected garbage and overflow from overtaxed latrines, thus causing health hazards.**

**UNDP, Ford Foundation and EDF (European Development Fund) are funding the project and ILO with associated agencies of UNCHS and UNV are executing. Originally the project duration was eighteen months, starting March 1994 and ending August 1995. However, in August 1995 a tripartite meeting took place and in that it was decided that the project should continue until March 1996.**

**The three immediate objectives are as follows:**

- 1. A pilot project on community-based employment-intensive storm water drainage infrastructure upgrading of Hanna Nassif will be successfully completed; introducing in turn some capacity within the Dar Es salaam City council to respond to such community based initiatives.**
- 2. The capacity for the Dar-Es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner with community-based urban upgrading proposals will be created and expanded.**
- 3. A support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni unplanned settlements, involving a network of community volunteers, will be established.**

**The activities under the present project have resulted in the formulation of new project proposals for continuation and expansion of the community based, labor intensive upgrading works in Dar Es Salaam**

**The purpose of the evaluation is to establish:**

- The relevance of the project objectives for urban upgrading in unplanned settlements.**
- The extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and**
- To make recommendations about its future orientations.**

## **II. Composition of mission team**

**The mission should consist of three independent consultants:**

- one expert on socio-economic and planning aspects of urban development with special reference to, low income settlements and**
- one expert in civil engineering with sufficient knowledge of labor based construction techniques in relation to roads and drainage in urban areas.**
- one national consultant who will be responsible for prior compiling the raw data and running a social and economic survey, together with project staff.**

**The mission should preferably have one member who speaks Swahili.**

## **III. Time schedule**

**The mission will take place preferably in 5th-19th Jan 1997 and the evaluation report will be finalized and submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO not later than 2 weeks after the field**

**mission.**

#### **IV. Scope of evaluation**

The immediate purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the project's objectives reflected the needs of the target groups, how the project was executed and the extent to which the initial targets have been met as well as the sustainability of the project. The evaluation team will, inter alia, assess the following elements:

##### *4.1 Relevance of the project*

- **relevance of the objectives in relation to the needs of the target groups and the general policy of the Government of Tanzania;**
- **efficiency of the institutional arrangements for project implementation;**
- **appropriateness of criteria for project selection and construction techniques as community contracts and labor based methods.**

##### *4.2 Project implementation*

- **adequacy of project designs, work plans, reporting and management;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by the counterpart agencies;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by CDC and the wider community in Hanna Nassif Settlement**
- **overall organization and technical supervision;**
- **physical progress, problems encountered and corrections made;**
- **labour utilization and productivity;**
- **appropriateness of form and level of incentives;**
- **effectiveness of community participation and community contracting system;**
- **cost of construction and cost-effectiveness of the project through comparative analysis with the data to be collected from other similar construction works;**
- **degree in which the project has been successfully implemented by the three UN agencies ( ILO, UNCHS and UNV) and the lessons learned from this inter - agency agreement.**

##### *4.3 Training program*

- **training programs, activities and relevance of training materials produced to the target groups.**

##### *4.4 Project Results*

- **quantity and quality of physical construction;**
- **improved living conditions (and extent to which water-borne related diseases have been reduced);**
- **number of short-term or long-term employment opportunities created through project activities;**
- **identification of beneficiaries and direct effects on their incomes;**
- **occurrence of multiplier effect, brought about by the increased households' incomes from the construction, especially their investment in microeconomic from the construction activities;**
- **degree to which the communities have developed their planning capacities;**
- **capacity building of relevant government institutions to carry out similar community-based programs with special reference to replicability and sustainability of the project approach,**

- including operation and maintenance of the developed works;
- capacity and effectiveness of the Community Development Committee to implement the project activities and to strengthen the organization/mobilization capacity of the community in Hanna Nassif.
- maintenance arrangements and participation by target groups.
- extent to which the project has been assimilated by community groups and government agencies at country and city level;

## V. Output

A standard UNDP in- depth evaluation report (5 typed copies) submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO. A copy of the report on diskette 3.5" in WP 5.1. is also required.

## ANNEX 2

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBRIEFING SESSION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION JANUARY 17, 1997 ILO Area Office

|                       |                    |                                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Nestor Joseph      | CDC                | Acting Chairman                    |
| 2. Hatima Ramadhani   | CDC                | Treasurer                          |
| 3. Mpayo Kasure       | City Commission    | Former Project Engineer            |
| 4. Dina Nnkya         | ILO                | Community Animator                 |
| 5. K.W. Salewi        | NIGP               | Civil Engineer                     |
| 6. M. Laiser          | NIGP               | Deputy Executive Director          |
| 7. Shaaban. Sheuya    | (ILO)/UCLAS        | Former project Coordinator         |
| 8. John Lupala        | Evaluation Mission | National Consultant (UCLAS)        |
| 9. Joyce Malombe      | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Nairobi University     |
| 10. Arpad Könye       | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Architect, Team Leader |
| 11. John Mbogoma      | UNDP               | Consultant                         |
| 12. F.T. Ernest       | City Commission    | For Commissioner of Planning       |
| 13. K. Pflieger       | UNDP               | Programme Officer                  |
| 14. Paul Schuttenbelt | SDP (HABITAT)      | Advisor, Programme Officer         |
| 15. Wilma Van Esch    | ILO                | Programme Officer                  |

## ANNEX 3 MISSION PROGRAMME

| SR NO | DAY & DATE              | ACTIVITY                    | TIME  | PLACE                 |
|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1     | Monday 6th January 1997 | Arrival of MS Joyce Malombe | 18.10 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

|    |                             |  |       |  |
|----|-----------------------------|--|-------|--|
| 2  | Tuesday 7th January 1997    | Arrival of A. Konye  | 08.20 | Dar es Salaam Airport                    |
|    |                             | Short visit to ILO Area Office                                       | 09.20 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
|    |                             | Signing of Contracts   | 10.00 | NIGP Office-Samora Avenue.               |
|    |                             | Meeting with ILO Area Director, Ms Singh & Wilma van Esch            | 12.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road  |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 15.30 | Hanna Nassif CDC Office                  |
| 3  | Wednesday 8th January 1997  | Meeting with Ms M. Kibogoya (LIFE)                                   | 09.30 | LIFE Office, UN Street                   |
|    |                             | Meeting with Jesse Kahwa (EDF)                                       | 11.00 | EDF Office, Kisutu.                      |
|    |                             | Meeting with A. Koroma (UNV)   | 12.00 | UNDP Office, Samora Avenue               |
|    |                             | Meeting with Prof. T. Rwebangira                                     | 16.00 | University of Dar es Salaam              |
| 4  | Thursday 9th January 1997   | Meeting with Prof. A.M. Nikundiwe, Principal, UCLAS                  | 09.00 | UCLAS Main Campus                        |
|    |                             | Meeting with B. Seleki (MLHUD)                                       | 14.00 | MLHUD, Sokoine Drive                     |
| 5  | Friday 10th January 1997    | Meeting with UNDP (Mr. Sisila, Mbogoma, Deputy Res. Rep Mr. Nhongo.) | 10.00 | UNDP Offices, Samora Avenue              |
|    |                             | Discussion with the ILO ( Wilma, Sheuya)                             | 14.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
| 6  | Saturday 11th January 1997  | Meeting with residents, Non-CDC members of Hanna Nassif              | 10.00 | Hanna Nassif                             |
|    |                             | Drafting and discussing table of contents of the report              | 12.00 | ILO Area Office.                         |
| 7  | Sunday 12th January 1997    | General Discussion on the Summary                                    | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 8  | Monday 13th January 1997    | Meeting with UNCHS and SDP (Paul Schuttenbelt and Majani B.B)        | 09.00 | Old Boma House, Sokoine Drive            |
|    |                             | Meeting with Shaaban Sheuya, Project Coordinator                     | 14.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 9  | Tuesday 14th January 1997   | Meeting with COWI-Consult (Claus Homman and Lema)                    | 09.00 | COWI-Consult Offices, Sea View, Upanga.  |
|    |                             | Meeting with NIGP (Mr. Salewi)                                       | 14.00 | NIGP Offices, Samora avenue              |
| 10 | Wednesday 15th January 1997 | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 14.00 | CDC Office, Hanna Nassif                 |
| 11 | Thursday 16th January 1997  | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |

|    |                                  |   |       |                       |
|----|----------------------------------|---|-------|-----------------------|
| 12 | Friday 17th<br>January<br>1997   | Finalisation of Draft Summary Report                              | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Debriefing of major findings and discussion of the summary report | 14.00 | ILO Area Office       |
| 13 | Saturday<br>18th January<br>1997 | Corrections and amendments of the summary report                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Departure of Ms Joyce Malombe                                     | 20.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |
| 14 | Sunday 19th<br>January<br>1997   | Departure of A. Konye   | 08.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

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## NOTES

### **1. A Gambian National**

### **2. A Liberian National**

**3. Under normal circumstances, many government employees supplement their incomes with part time jobs, be it in the formal or informal sector. Thus the stationing of DCC staff members to Hanna Nassif without adequate remuneration provide the possible explanation for their limited participation in the project.**

**4. It is a common practice for many workshops and seminars to pay sitting allowances to participants. This was not done for the case Hanna Nassif with the understanding that the time spent by the CDC members was part of their contributions to the project.**

**5. Local Fundis are locally trained masons, carpenters, and plumbers who actively engage in many construction works at local neighbourhood level.**

Updated by BC. Approved by SR. Last update: 31 March, 1998.

## *Evaluation of Hanna Nassif community based urban upgrading project phase I, cont.*

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### 4.0 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION



Construction of the main storm water drain by gabions



Completed murrum road

#### **4.1 Adequacy of Project Design, Preparatory Work, Reporting and Management**

As described earlier, the evaluation mission considers that the project design was logical and correct, but underestimated the difficulties of dealing with new urban communities. The implementation team was indulgent by accepting to work with incomplete designs and fluctuating technical staff. The fact that

Hanna Nassif project was implemented by the community, a stage by stage design and construction process which aimed at training the community in simple design and construction techniques was followed. It is factual that from traditional project management point of view, the fluctuating technical staff and lack of comprehensive designs resulted into delays, reconstruction of weak structures and increase in the construction costs. However, it is worth noting here that if the objective of training in skills of the local community was to be achieved, the adoption of traditional project management was likely to overshadow this objective. The ILO engineering consultant who worked closely together (although very irregular) with the community and counter part national engineer, facilitated the preparation of a training manual to local '*fundis*'<sup>5</sup> and the community at large. The need for establishing adaptive forms of design and construction techniques for both the local community and the traditional project management seems to be apparent.

It was important that the project team prepared and maintained detailed budget, financial plans, engineering cost estimates and comparisons on the basis of which the implementation could have been managed and community contracts awarded. At the time of the evaluation, it was still not possible to analyze costs and labour inputs due to lack of consolidated data. It was understood that an ILO Consultant will have to prepare these in the next few weeks.

There were regular Steering Committee Meetings chaired by the City Director who was also the Project Director. This procedure was later interrupted because there were frequent changes in the city leadership (City Directors). It became less frequent but the meetings continued until the end of the first phase of the project i.e. in August 1996. Besides Steering Committee Meetings, the project had several Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review meeting.

Every week there were TST and CDC meetings to review the progress of the project. There was therefore weekly, monthly and quarterly progress reports which were prepared by the TST up to October 1996. Also minutes of the CDC meetings addressing the progress of the project have been well documented.

#### **4.2 Efficiency of Institutional Arrangement for Project Implementation**

The general institutional arrangement seems to have been operating efficiently with a coordinatory mechanism which was facilitated by the Steering Committee, Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review Meeting. Each Agency played its role as was foreseen in the project document with the exception of some few incidences as elaborated in section 5.2

#### **4.3 Justification and Relevance of the Objectives**

The project document addressed one of the most acute problems of Hanna Nassif namely flooding. Due to constraints of the economy, the Government was unable to upgrade and alleviate poverty in the area and several other unplanned settlements. Considering the magnitude of the problems it also realized that it will not be able to solve these problems alone. The concept of empowering local communities to participate in construction of their most needed infrastructure seemed to be one of the most realistic alternatives of upgrading unplanned settlements. For this reason, community participation in infrastructure construction has been a realistic objective in Hanna Nassif project and will also be so for a long time in other similar projects in the country.

The Government has recognized the potential of community involvement and presently, this approach is being expanded to other settlements on the basis of preliminary results of Hanna Nassif. Similarly the concept of community involvement in settlement upgrading has been well incorporated in the Urban

Development Policy(1995) as pointed out in section 1.1.2. The project objectives were also strongly supported by several International Agencies and Donors.

#### 4.4 Achievement of Objectives

The **development objective** of the project was defined as *improved living conditions and expanded employment opportunities in urban settlements in Dar es Salaam*. The project largely achieved this objective. The project also supported the Government's policy as expressed in its Economic and Social Adjustment Programme which recommends the upgrading of infrastructure services, efficient mobilization of domestic resources and enhanced people's participation in the operation and maintenance.

Although no data was available to indicate the reduction of water -borne diseases, it was imperative that such improved infrastructure and especially in drainage leads to reduction of water-borne diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera and bilharzia. This should also improve the community health, reduce medical bills and thus increase potential savings. The household solid waste removal program managed by women groups contribute to better health conditions in Hanna Nassif. Similarly, there are household savings from reduced house repairs inflicted by annual floods. Improved accessibility has promoted commercial activities in the area where micro-enterprise activities are evident. Improved environmental conditions have also increased and stimulated improved land values and housing market in the settlement.

The **intermediate objective** was specified as the contribution to the achievement of the development objective *to demonstrate the feasibility of community-based approach to urban settlement up-grading*. The project achieved also this objective since the implementation of Phase I of Hanna Nassif through community management and contracts is a proof of the feasibility of the approach. The experience gained so far has been largely contributing to the improvement of other projects in Dar es Salaam city.

With regard to three **immediate objectives** the achievements were as follows:

**The immediate objective 1:** *A pilot project on community-based, employment intensive storm water drainage infrastructure up-grading of the Hanna Nassif informal settlement; creating in turn the capacity within Dar es Salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives*. The project and the inexperienced community were particularly successful to achieve this immediate objective by producing; **Output 1:** *A functioning and maintainable storm water and other basic infrastructure services improved to good technical standards*. The work was carried out by broad community participation and by using labour-intensive methods, community contracts and through the management of the CDC and the Technical Support Team. A total of 600 metres of main storm water channel, 1500 metres of side drain and 1000 meters of murram road have been constructed. The details of physical progress of the project have been explained under section 4.5. Similarly, training materials like videos, construction and maintenance guidelines and plans were prepared as was foreseen in the project document.

**Output 2:** *Employment created, in the magnitude of about 15,000 workdays of paid and 5,000 workdays of community contribution*. The project achieved the employment creation above this target i.e. 24,430 being 4,430 work days above the target. Of the created work days 65% constituted of man-days and 35%. women-days. Basically all construction work was carried out by using labour-based methods under community contracts The cost for the created work days was Tshs. Tshs 36.920.887. Unskilled laborers were paid about Tshs. 800/= while skilled laborers received Tshs. 1600/= a day. The project was also successful in training community members in construction skills, technical and legal aspects of community contracts, accounting and storekeeping. It was however, less successful in training community groups supposedly to be established as petty contractors at a later date. This was beyond the

financial and technical capability of the project, and thus an over-optimistic target.

**Output 3:** *A community management capacity to maintain the infrastructure constructed, coordinate its own physical development standards, and identify future priority needs.* The project prepared maintenance training materials and trained selected people through the actual construction works, workshops and seminars. Although the "10% maintenance fund" was available for the CDC, the project could not yet start the maintenance program. This will remain a priority task of the Phase II. On the other hand, the project could launch needed secondary activities, like waste removal through the establishment of active women's groups and a feasibility study for waste recycling. These programmes should be strengthened and expanded.

**The immediate objective 2:** *The capacity for the Dar es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner to community-based urban up-grading proposals be created and expanded.* The achievements were as follows:

**Output 1:** *A Technical working group trained in community-based up-grading.* There were difficulties to obtain the right seconded technical personnel from the DCC for the elaboration of designs and plans. It took also a long time to assign a survey team to the Kinondoni Zonal Office. However, a series of group meetings were held on Hanna Nassif by the SDP working group on unplanned settlements and other NGOs engaged in settlement up-grading activities. By this, a group of experts has been developed and trained in the concept.

**Output 2:** *A Training Manual giving step by step guidelines for replication of the process in other settlements prepared.* Although a manual as such was not prepared, but the project produced regular reports which were disseminated to and discussed with interested parties. The findings were extensively used in formulation of projects in the pipeline at the time of the evaluation by other agencies and donors.

**Output 3:** *A report on the impact of the project so as to avoid harmful effects during preparation and implementation of future proposals.* See output 4 below.

**Output 4:** *A survey report written identifying the next 10 unplanned settlements for replication.* Seven unplanned settlements were selected as priority project areas under the World Bank funded Community Infrastructure Programme. In these projects, the Hanna Nassif experience was widely used. Furthermore, Ardhi Institute prepared a socio-economic study on Hanna Nassif which is also being used by DCC Technical Staff under the SDP. The positive elements of Hanna Nassif are being adopted in other donor supported projects.

**The immediate objective 3:** *Targeted a support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni settlements, involving a network of community volunteers.* The project has experienced great difficulties in achieving this target. The obstacles are described under section. 3.3 in details. Several activities foreseen under outputs 2 and 3 are left for Phase II. The modest achievement is rather due to the over-optimistic project design than to the project team. It will, in all probability, take long time, until the culture of community ownership will be developed.

#### *4.4.1 Relationship Between Objectives, Outputs and Inputs*

The evaluation mission evidenced that the project document followed a logical design with regard of objectives and outputs, but it grossly underestimated the time and special expertise required to motivate communities, particularly to raise and collect community contributions and develop ownership spirit. It also underestimated the engineering inputs needed for preparation and implementation. However, considering the total budget of Phase I, the achievement so far, particularly the physical output was considerable and very positive. The project design should have foreseen activities going over to the

Phase II. This is now one of the priority task of the University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (UCLAS), the implementing agency of the second phase, namely to identify those activities which should continue.

#### 4.4.2 Beneficiaries

The population of Hanna Nassif are the primary beneficiaries of the project through the important infrastructure services created which improve living and health conditions in the settlement. The construction work created direct employment and income for community members, while the future operation and maintenance of the services will provide additional employment. The community also learned to identify, organize and manage such projects, handle technical and financial matters of the operation. Another beneficiary is the City Councils which, through secondment of staff to the project learned important experience on community managed settlement upgrading works. Future settlements will also benefit from the unique experience of Hanna Nassif.

Future community mobilizers and NGOs will benefit as well from both the positive and negative experience of the project when being trained in different aspects of community motivation and participation.

#### 4.5 Physical Progress Made

The physical progress made until 31<sup>st</sup> August 1996 is summarized in table 4.1 below;

**Table 4.1 Physical Progress Made as at 31st August 1996**

| SR NO | PLANNED ACTIVITY   | IMPLEMENTATION STATUS  | ESTIMATED % ACHIEVEMENT | REMARKS  |
|-------|--|--|-------------------------|--|
| 1.    | 2.5 Km murrum road with lined drains                           | 1.0 Km Murrum road with side drains (lined) constructed.                         | 40%                     | Special maintenance arrangement is needed before the road starts to erode. |
| 2.    | 1.5 Km lined drains  | 1.5 Km side drains and 0.6 km main drain.  | 80%                     | Main drain is almost completed.  |
| 3.    | 1.5 Km of improved footpath                                    | about 0.7 Km along the main drain and at the end of road No. 1 has been improved | 50%                     |  |
| 4.    | 11 protected points for drainage discharge into Msimbazi Creek | 2 major protected outlet constructed.  | --                      | Dependent on the revisions made in the plans.                              |
| 5.    | 10 road drifts   | More than 10 constructed   | 100%                    | More provision because of the change of design.                            |
| 6.    | 15 footpath culverts   | 10 vehicular culverts crossing main drain and road No. 1 have been constructed.  | 65%                     | Changed to cater for vehicular access.                                     |
| 7.    | Scour protection to existing gullies in the settlement         | Gabions provided instead   | 100%                    |  |

The overall quality of the work, particularly that of the drains is acceptable (with some exceptions) and

considerably better than what one would expect from inexperienced community labor. **The created infrastructure is functional, maintainable and serves the purposes.**

#### 4.6 Problems Encountered and Corrections Made

Despite the positive achievements in the physical progress of developing phase I of this project, there were few problems encountered during the implementation process and where necessary corrections made. These included the following:

- The project underestimated the need for comprehensive designs of both road and drainage channels. It seems the engineering design were made piece by piece concurrent with the construction stage. While the aim might have been to provide flexibility in the construction stages but this did not exempt the need of preparing comprehensive designs through which amendments could have been made. Subsequently due to lack of adequate supervision, some sections of the drain was to be demolished and reconstructed. COWI-consult was later on called to make some supervision of the construction and documentation of the designs.
- Some engineering components were also not or partially considered despite their significance in infrastructure works. For example laboratory soil tests, thickness and capacity of the road base and road design were given partial significance in such a construction work.
- Seemingly, the CDC and the TST who were deciding which type of work should be carried out and by who underestimated some of these inputs mainly in belief that they can be done without hiring a consultant or contractor. This brought some implementation problems which necessitated the need of engaging COWI- Consult to supervise the work.
- There are a few work items which still have to be completed. For example, hundreds of steel bars (10-40 cm long) are left standing out from the drain walls in very lengthy sections of the drain which may cause serious injuries to children and persons passing by. The walls of the open drain (some sections are 1.5 meter deep) do not have any uniform edges which would not only give a better engineering appearance to the drains, but protect people from slipping into the drain. The quality of the murrum road is also to be improved.

#### 4.7 Construction Costs and Cost Effectiveness

The cost breakdowns are as follows:

|                        |                 |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| Equipment              | Tshs 3.907.750  |
| Survey instruments     | US\$ 14.976     |
| Tools                  | Not quantified  |
| Construction materials | Tshs 76.095.109 |
| Labour wages           | Tshs 36.920.887 |

The funds spent on labour wages represent the sum of about US\$ 60,000, or little bit less than 25% of the total investment costs. This could indicate that the program was relatively less "labour-intensive" and more material intensive due to high cost of the reinforced concrete main drain. However the project can be classified as a labour based project as all work has been carried out by manual labour using hand

tools (the use of a concrete mixer is the only exception). This is also shown in the costs of equipment and tools which were very modest. Although final cost breakdowns are still not yet established, and no tender was organized which would allow comparison, it seems that the construction through community contracts was higher than COWI Consultants cost estimate. This may be due to the inexperience of the community to use labour and materials according to work standards, and the difficulty to organize construction works in a densely built-up area. The higher costs were also due to the urgency work measures, like working longer hours, as well as on Saturdays and Sundays, in order to complete the main drain as much as possible in the dry season. The main drain was partly constructed during the rainy season necessitating some of the works to be repeated. The devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling for the money which was budgeted in US\$ but released at later dates also contributed a reduction in the total available budget for construction costs (Refer to table 1.1).

In principle, community contracts are exempt of taxes, and exclude overhead costs and profit, they should therefore be more cost effective than private contractors' works.

On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that the project was implemented within the approved original budget and within reasonable time.

The project management did not prepare cost estimates and comparisons. For this reason it was not possible for the evaluation mission to analyze cost-effectiveness from the existing data. Based on consultations with Engineering Consultants, the evaluation team was of the opinion that the construction costs were on the higher side. The conclusion is based on the unit costs of infrastructure which is in the case of storm water drain was about US\$ 250 per metre, and that of road, about US\$ 48,000 per kilometre. Particularly the cost of the road was high. The greatest part of the investment was spent on materials and transport of cement, steel bars, timber and gravel. As mentioned earlier, one of the reason of the higher cost was certainly that all the works including procurement being carried out by an inexperienced CDC and unskilled workers under community contracts. The problems encountered at the beginning of the project which resulted into delays in the construction process also contributed to higher costs. Although the final quality is acceptable and the infrastructure is durable and maintainable, some of the work items, should have been done better if constant engineering input and experience in community managed projects was available.

The evaluation mission team underlines that the CDC, despite the described short-comings made a good job in producing the physical output.

#### **4.8 Community Contracting and Labour Based Methods**

The implementation methodology was through Community Construction Contracts (CCC). It was the CDC which, with the assistance of the TST, identified sub-projects, priorities and approved engineering designs. On the basis of bills of quantities for materials, the CDC awarded contracts for community members who executed the contracts. The CDC's Construction Committee took full responsibility for the supervision of the procurement, organization of voluntary and hired labor, construction activities and quality control. Of course the technical personnel largely assisted and guided the process which was community based in real terms. It should be underlined that the strong determination of the community to undertake all possible construction was the driving force behind the success of constructing the infrastructure. The evaluation mission, however noted also that the decision of the CDC to keep all contracts for community execution was a commanding act, but it overestimated the technical capabilities of the community and it resulted in problems in the construction (quality and costs). In the next phase it is advisable to make a clear distinction between works which can be implemented through community contracts and works which could be better carried out by labour-based contractors.

## 4.9 Training Programmes, Materials and Activities

Training programmes involved on job training to participating Masons, Carpenters and unskilled people. Seminars and workshops to both CDC and the people (beneficiaries) were also conducted. A study tour to Kenya and Uganda for some CDC members to visit similar projects has been planned and organized within the training programme. One Financial Clerk and a Stores Assistant have been trained to manage financial matters, procurement and storage of materials.

A total of 8 workshops were agreed upon including community awareness workshop, construction workshop, project implementation, CDC, community group identification, income generation and community evaluation. Five workshops were concentrating on construction and maintenance skills of the drains and road.

Substantial amount of training materials have been made available to the CDC. They include manuals, reports, consultancy reports, policy papers, books and booklets, maps, photographs, bulletins, newsletters and journals. A few of these materials have been translated into Swahili for use of the CDC members and the rest of Hanna Nassif people. Besides the above, the SDP had video-filmed the project for both documentation and training purposes.

### *4.9.1 Relevance of the Training Materials Produced to the Needs of the Target Group*

Many of the training materials have been written in English which might not be very useful to the common people who do not understand the language. However, for the skilled and learned people the materials produced will be used as reference and training inputs in construction skills. The audio and visual materials such as photographs and video films also provide an asset for training the people within Hanna Nassif.

## 4.10 Improved Planning Capacity of the Communities

**By the end of the first Phase, the Community and the CDC (despite their internal differences) gained experience and demonstrated true capabilities to address infrastructure needs of Hanna Nassif. It is commendable that the community organized and maintained the present alignment of the infrastructure which crossed through private lands and properties without demolition and compensation. It also recruited community labour. It was also capable of planning and executing all sequences of the construction, from planning through procurement to construction, which is a difficult task even for an experienced contractor. The CDC grew up to this task and proved that communities can complement city authorities by undertaking several responsibilities of infrastructure development in their respective settlements.**

## 4.11 Capacity Building of Relevant Government Institutions and Extent to Which the Concept has Been Accepted by Other Community Groups

**This objective was specifically targeted to the City Commission by involving its staff in the project so as to acquire more skills and experience in similar undertakings. The secondment of the city engineer, planners and a surveyor was a good approach to this endeavor. But the entire participation of Planners and the Engineer and the insufficient number of the seconded staff to the project does not guarantee that adequate capacity has been built to respond to the magnitude of problems of unplanned settlements at the city level. Additional inputs are still required to involve more DCC staff in other projects planned under the CIP so as to comprehend other community needs. However, for smaller projects similar to that of Hanna Nassif the capacity developed is a**

## **potential that can be utilised to solve problems in other settlements**

**In general, the project was successful in involving a large number of National Agencies and Institutions, as recommended in the project document. The progress of the project got wide media presentation. The Ardhi Institute (now UCLAS), one of the competent technical bodies of the country has been continuously engaged in studying and analyzing the project, while the City Council and International Agencies used and referred to the experience of Hanna Nassif in their new projects. Many of the responsible technical staff of these institutions are well informed of results and different aspects of the project. No doubt, Hanna Nassif became the reference of many other national project proposals.**

**The concept of community based infrastructure improvement has been widely accepted by the local communities as evidenced by the establishment of about 10 CBOs city wide. The establishment of these CBOs stems from the government failure to deliver services to the people. While the establishments of these CBOs started mainly in the 1990s, the pace at which they have emerged is a clear manifestation of acute infrastructure deficiency in unplanned settlements. It also reflects peoples' trust on CBOs and the common understanding that the Local Authorities can no longer reach the people at grassroots level.**

**As regards to Hanna Nassif, the establishment of the CDC was a good starting point despite its operational and organizational problems. The establishment of the CDC also motivated the establishment of women groups which have been working hand in hand with the CDC in the cleaning of the constructed drains. It was also observed that there exist a youth group which is yet to be registered. The Women and Youth groups have been undertaking specific issue based activities for environmental improvement and poverty alleviation.**

**As pointed out above (refer section 1.1.2), the Government, particularly the MLHUD incorporated community participation as a component in the Draft Urban Development policy of 1995 and the 1993 National Land Policy. This is a recognition of CBO efforts and the role they are playing to upgrade their settlements.**

**The provision of permit to the CDC to collect revenue from road toll for Hanna Nassif by the City Commission is also an understanding or acceptability of this concept from the Urban Local Authority point of view. It is in line with the idea of delegating responsibilities and powers to the grassroots CBOs. Possibilities also exist for the DCC to grant permit to the CDC to collect revenue from other sources so as to supplement revenue collected from road toll and enable the Community maintain the laid down infrastructure.**

### **4.12 Capacity and Effectiveness of the CDC to Implement the Project, Motivate and Mobilize the Community**

**The CDC was successful in mobilizing the community for the physical work and in constructing the infrastructure as well as handling project accounts. It demonstrated also initiatives and drive in contracting and mobilizing national agencies and donors. It was able to get recognition as the representative of the community. On the other hand, the CDC was not successful in motivating the community to contribute and undertake maintenance work due to described problems within the community (see section 3.5). It is the Phase II which has to carry out the required changes in the CDC and introduce an appropriate methodology on community mobilization.**

### **4.13 Role of the Three UN Agencies (ILO, UNCHS, UNV) and Lessons Learnt**

As explained in section 2.1, the role of each of these agencies was quite exemplary and efficient. However, a more extensive coordination was required from the part of the UNDP to streamline some of the misunderstanding which arose from the side of the UNV as pointed out in section 5.2

#### 4.14 Sustainability

##### *4.14.1 Operation and Maintenance Arrangements*

Occasional cleaning of the canal has been carried out. The women groups have been cleaning the channels after completion of the construction works. The 'new CDC' should rely and extend the activities of these groups. More residents should be mobilized to make regular cleaning and small maintenance on the section of the infrastructure which passes through, or is in front of their properties. Unfortunately, regular organized maintenance has not been started so far which is one of the set-backs of the project. It is imperative that routine and periodic maintenance works start without delay because several sections of the infrastructure, particularly that of the road show signs of deterioration. The CDC already possesses a considerable amount of money (i.e. Tshs 540,000) for this purposes and funds originated from the 10% of the donors' financed construction costs. Therefore the immediate financial input is available. Community contribution so far is unimportant. The launching of a viable maintenance system remains therefore the priority task of the second phase.

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## 5.0 LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS



**Completed murram roads and side drains. Side drains show lack of maintenance**



**The lessons drawn from Phase I of Hanna Nassif Community Based Urban Upgrading Project have been summarized as follows;**

### **5.1 Potentials Inherent in the Project**

- (i) The establishment of a functioning CDC which managed to make decisions and close supervision of the day to day activities of the project is a positive sign that the project can be successfully carried forward to phase II with some minor corrections.**
- (ii) The knowledge gained by the CDC members on the overall community, and project set-up, their roles and responsibility, the training in skills (e.g. store keeping and managing the accounts) and labour based construction techniques are potential gains that can be utilized in future operation and maintenance of the project.**
- (iii) The fact that more than 86% of the houses within Hanna Nassif are owner occupied, provide a chance of positive participation of residents if proper mobilization and trust is instilled among community members.**
- (iv) The constructed drains and roads are assets that the CDC can utilize to generated funds for the operation and maintenance and creation of jobs to residents of the area. Other benefit accruing from the project is the increase in land value and growth of petty trading and other home based enterprises.**
- (v) The project will continue to be a good example for Community Based Settlement Upgrading and therefore, it should be supported so as to achieve the desired objectives.**
- (vi) Community participation was observed to exist at two levels. The first one is the part being played by the CDC and the second one is the part played by the wider Community. At CDC level, there is no doubt that they tried their best to make the project a success despite its shortcomings. The CDC managed to work together with the Donor and Executing Agencies, the DCC, the TST and to some extent with the wider Community of Hanna Nassif. This task has never been done by any CBO in this country. On the part of the Community, they tried to participate wherever**

requested but as elaborated under section 3.0 the process of mobilization and building a community still calls for additional time to cultivate a sense of belonging and responsibility to community managed projects.

(vii) The TST constituted of personnel from the Executing Agencies and seconded staff from the DCC. The execution of Hanna Nassif project have exposed several members of the TST on how to deal with the problems within the local communities. As a pilot project, the knowledge gained by these members provide an asset in adapting similar approaches to other unplanned settlements of Dar es Salaam and the country at large.

## 5.2 Problems and Constraints

Despite of the achievements that have been registered in phase I of the project, there were several problems that hindered the achievement of the project objectives as summarized below;

- (i) Technical aspects particularly the comprehension of engineering design was not adequately addressed in beginning of the project. Although the approach was an attempt to involve the community in the design and construction stages, it was undermined by inadequate construction and supervisory work as compounded by the engineer who abandoned the project. The designs, supervision and other components like soil tests, comprehensive survey, etc. lacked in the beginning stage of the project.
- (ii) The role of the CDC in the project was somehow over-emphasized. This created a sense of being able to deliver technical works which otherwise were above the capabilities and experience of the CDC.
- (iii) The inter-Agency and multi-donor sponsored project execution provided a good experience on how co-ordination can collectively contribute to alleviating poverty, improving the living environment and generating employment. But somehow, the donor-specific objectives in provision of support slowed down the implementation process of the project.
- (iv) There were some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the project document which led to duplication of responsibilities. For instance while the project had already recruited the Project Coordinator and Animator for more than six months from the start of the project, the UNV was also in belief to assign a UNV personnel with Project Coordinator tasks.
- (v) While the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) is the beneficiary of the project, its participation in the project through secondment of staff particularly the Town planners was rather erratic. Other staff members frequently abandoned their seconded positions. This problem contributed to delays in the implementation process of the project. Except for the engineer and a surveyor who were seconded to the project under the UNCHS contracts, it was revealed that there were no incentives which were paid to the Planners. To some extent, this provide explanation for their erratic participation in the project. In future projects this issue has to be resolved.
- (vi) The Steering Committee Meetings were irregular due to the frequent changes of the city Directors. As of November 1996, the project has had five different Project Directors. This phenomenon contributed to the interruption in the implementation process since the City Director is also a signatory of the CDC project accounts.
- (vii) The Evaluation Mission noted that there were two Steering Committees one for Community Infrastructure Programme (CIP) and the other one for Hanna Nassif Project. Both committees are

**being chaired by City Commission. In order to simplify coordination and concentrate effort, it would have been more practical to have only one Steering Committee. This would also have enhanced sharing and learning.**

**(viii) Community mobilization and participation is a long process. There was therefore a need to give adequate time to address different community issues and not assume that the commitment of the CDC was shared by other members of the community. This was particularly important given past community experiences on development projects where people were never consulted and their participation was only assumed.**

**(ix) The commitment and enthusiasm of the CDC was also mistaken to mean a cohesive community. This wrong assumption was based on the fact that similar activities had not taken place before. There is therefore need for community leadership development and organization - a factor that was taken for granted at the beginning because community leaders were assumed to represent all the interests of the community.**

**(x) Lack of experiences with formation, running and leadership of CBOs also contributed to this very complex situation. Similarly, inadequate community mobilization augmented further the problem of poor community participation.**

**(xi) Failures in community contribution hinges heavily on the extent to which mobilization and participation of the entire community was carried out. This, also reiterates the issue of inadequate representation of the wider community.**

**(xii) Historical development and culture of the people plays an important part in mobilization and participation. The residents of this area had already been mobilized for activities that never took place and were therefore skeptical about the whole process. Again this manifested itself in the poor response in contribution from the community.**

**(xiii) Previously the government had been the main provider of services and it took time for community members to see their role and hence the reluctance to participate. Enthusiasm of the CDC is however notable in bridging this barrier and proving their commitment to change the situation. This idea of volunteering to guide the process was not necessarily shared by the wider community - a factor that explains their "sitting back and waiting for things to happen" attitude. Immediate participation of donors without proper preparation perpetuated this dependency syndrome.**

**(xiv) Excessive donor contribution augmented the problem of residents' contribution thinking that funds were readily available.**

**(xv) Cost contribution for priority infrastructure needs as well as for operation and maintenance responsibilities should be agreed with participating CBOs from the outset of the project. This is considered necessary not only to establish a demand-driven program to ensure a sense of commitment and ownership but also to overcome the above mentioned distrust and, in the case of Hanna Nassif prevent donor dependency which eroded cost recovery mechanisms.**

**(xvi) Within the community leadership, there existed a division of opposing group, the 'Wasomi' (the educated) who thought that the CDC should be composed of the educated people and the 'Wasiosoma' (the non-educated) who incidentally, constitute the majority of the current CDC. While the Wasiosoma have been promoting participation, the Wasomi group has been against these efforts.**

**(xvii) The legal status of the CDC is still at stake in so far as the Hanna Nassif Community Development Association (HNCDA) amended constitution is yet to be registered. Efforts should be made to finalize this task so as to institute a legally established Association in the area.**

**(xviii) Whilst efforts were made to support the establishment of the CDC there was no community planning. Even during the construction phase of the main drain there was a low level of understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the various actors including individuals, households, as well as the CDC.**

**(xix) This clearly indicate the importance of transparency and clear definition of the problem facing a particular section of the community. Regular reporting on the community fund is crucial to win community trust. People would like to have access to decision making mechanism over contribution they pay. Thus the process of laying down principles of accountability and peoples involvement in the decision making process seems to be very basic for the realization of participation and willingness to contribute.**

**(xx) There are some minor works which are yet to be completed for security and convenient utilization of the drains by the residents as elaborated under section 4.6**

### **5.3 Recommendations**

**(i) The construction of the second phase is recommended to start on the basis of full surveys, complete engineering designs, bill of quantities and cost estimates. Works that can be done by the community and by contractors should be distinguished. COWI Consult design input may be used as a model.**

**(ii) "External" technical assistance like engineering designs, construction supervision and community mobilization should be sought from the previous Agencies which were involved as executing and /or associated Agencies in the project. Similarly, technical assistance may be sought from petty contractors (for those available) and consultants where the implementing agent may fall short of such services.**

**(iii) All engineering works should be completed in order to ensure proper functioning of the infrastructure and facilitate regular maintenance of the created assets. These works include, completion of the remaining section of the main drain, completion of the edge of the main drain, cutting the erecting steel bars and providing covers or protection walls where it was observed to be unsafe to children and night walks.**

**(iv) Coordination of upgrading programs at city level and dissemination of the Hanna Nassif experiences to facilitate learning should be ensured. This can be done by maintaining one Steering Committee for all upgrading projects.**

**(v) The explanation of the roles of the National Executing Agencies, the NIGP, DCC, UCLAS, CDC and supporting UN Agencies, the ILO, UNCHS and UNV need to be clearly defined from the very beginning of the second phase of the project.**

**(vi) The DCC should provide more support to the CDC activities through secondment of its qualified technical staff as it used to be in the first phase of the project. However, special remuneration and financial support should be provided to the team members seconded to the project. This will ensure their permanent attachment and gaining experience in community infrastructure upgrading works.**

(vii) The DCC should revise its legal aspects, responsibilities and powers so as to enable CDC undertake small upgrading activities in their localities and collect revenue for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure works. Property taxes, land rents, road tolls, user charges, may be partially or wholly collected by the CDC for the purpose of funding operational activities in their areas. Experience shows that revising DCC regulations and by-laws prove to be a time consuming exercise. In order to ease the process, interim procedures such as memoranda of agreement may be persuaded whereby the CDC enters into a compromise with the DCC in making collections of the taxes. It is recommended that the tax collection exercise using a CBO be pioneered in Hanna Nassif and if proved successful, a mechanism of adopting it to other parts of the city should be instituted.

(viii) Formation and strengthening of small groups within Hanna Nassif is very important. This will encourage such groups to address different issues. The approach in doing so may include the subdivision of Hanna Nassif settlement into smaller issue based community groups with cohesive force that will ease communication between the CDC and these groups. Such groups should elect their leaders who will represent them in the CDC. The community groups should be clearly defined both geographically and if possible socio-economically.

(ix) Future projects need to allocate more time and resources to community mobilization since it is an essential pre-requisite for any community based initiative. This is not simply to establish, strengthen, train and empower CBOs in their role as service coordinators, but additional inputs are required to overcome the major distrust that has been built up between CBOs and the administration over many years.

(x) Adequate community mobilization and planning will confirm grassroots priority needs, levels and standards of affordable service provision, resolve conflicting interests, agree upon optimal plan, strengthen local ownership and commitments, whilst paving the way for active CBO involvement in plan implementation. It is therefore recommended that in phase 2, emphasis should be put in mobilization and participation. For this, there is a need for trained staff who understand community mobilization, organization and participation. This is an issue that has to be spearheaded by local people who understand the dynamics of the communities involved. Technical personnel cannot be expected to perform this role and so are inexperienced community animators.

(xi) Development of community leadership and resolving of the current leadership wrangles must also be dealt with. This is particularly important given the fact that the current leadership is divided - a fact that jeopardizes the wider community involvement. There is a need for an impartial moderator to discuss the existing problems with the two groups and come out with a solution so as to come up with a smooth transition to elected representatives. Further it will be important to hold elections after the registration of the CBO. There is however, a need for communities to be sensitized on the whole process. The roles of leaders should be clearly discussed and allow the communities to select leaders that they can trust. The three year term of CDC members has elapsed. It is important to maintain continuity and not lose all the skills learned in the first phase. There is a need therefore, to retain at least one-third of the current CDC leadership. The current leadership division between the educated "*wasomi*" and the illiterate "*wasiosoma*" has to be resolved immediately because it threatens the smooth running of the project. For example, one group is promoting participation while another is de-motivating the community from involvement.

(xii) Future projects should insist on equal representation of men and women in development committees. The Hanna Nassif project set a good example in repeating elections in order to allow adequate representation of women. This is an issue that should not be left to community leaders

who mostly follow traditions that exclude women from the decision making process. The requirement to include women was particularly important because this is not traditionally a sector where women are automatically involved. Paid labor based construction has been a domain of men is well illustrated by the low participation of women at the beginning of the project. Their involvement later increased and by the end of the project their contribution constituted 35% of the total labor.

(xiii) Equal participation of women in both leadership and employment should also be ensured. Women groups who are involved in maintenance and provision of community services should be supported and trained. Young people of the settlement should have access to employment created by such projects. Extra efforts should be made to make the women and youths groups registered and cooperate with the CDC in both execution of the next phase of the project and the operation and maintenance of the already laid down infrastructure. By doing so, several projects can be executed within the community and the process of mobilizing the community will be simplified.

(xiv) The community contract system should continue and be improved in order to better address employment needs. There is also need for a revolving fund to enable communities to undertake other economic activities because temporary employment solves only a part of the problems. Initiation of new activities will be possible given the fact that the infrastructure services are already operational.

(xv) The launching of training to small / petty contractors at the preparatory stage of the second phase should be made possible under, or in cooperation with other such training centres to train selected community members in infrastructure design and construction skills.

(xvi) Community contribution should be given due consideration in the next phase. A special contribution mechanism should be instituted and effectively monitored. Transparency in both contributions, external support and expenditure of collected revenue should be instilled. Special expertise is required to support this activities, qualified national consultants and NGO's have to be invited to assist, and in case of lack of such expertise, special training programs should be organized for individuals and NGOs;

(xvii) The constitutions of the CDC's should be legally registered and existing ones revisited to reflect the current requirements of the local residents. Residents should participate in the making of constitution and subsequent revisions.

Dar es Salaam, May 1997

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PROJECT EVALUATION HANNA NASSIF

#### IMPROVING LIVING CONDITIONS AND EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN URBAN-LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES

##### I. Background information

**The project is part of an inter-agency program aimed at improving living conditions and expanding employment opportunities in low income settlements.**

**Hanna Nassif settlement is located in Kinondoni District, Dar Es Salaam. The area covers 44 and has a population of 19,000 people. In this settlement severe flooding occurs during the rainy season due to absence of drainage channels. The rainwater mixes with uncollected garbage and overflow from overloaded latrines, thus causing health hazards.**

**UNDP, Ford Foundation and EDF (European Development Fund) are funding the project and ILO with associated agencies of UNCHS and UNV are executing. Originally the project duration was eighteen months, starting March 1994 and ending August 1995. However, in August 1995 a tripartite meeting took place and in that it was decided that the project should continue until March 1996.**

**The three immediate objectives are as follows:**

- 1. A pilot project on community-based employment-intensive storm water drainage infrastructure upgrading of Hanna Nassif will be successfully completed; introducing in turn some capacity within the Dar Es Salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives.**
- 2. The capacity for the Dar-Es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner with community-based urban upgrading proposals will be created and expanded.**
- 3. A support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni unplanned settlements, involving a network of community volunteers, will be established.**

**The activities under the present project have resulted in the formulation of new project proposals for continuation and expansion of the community based, labor intensive upgrading works in Dar Es Salaam**

**The purpose of the evaluation is to establish:**

- The relevance of the project objectives for urban upgrading in unplanned settlements.**
- The extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and**
- To make recommendations about its future orientations.**

## **II. Composition of mission team**

**The mission should consist of three independent consultants:**

- one expert on socio-economic and planning aspects of urban development with special reference to, low income settlements and**
- one expert in civil engineering with sufficient knowledge of labor based construction techniques in relation to roads and drainage in urban areas.**
- one national consultant who will be responsible for prior compiling the raw data and running a social and economic survey, together with project staff.**

**The mission should preferably have one member who speaks Swahili.**

## **III. Time schedule**

**The mission will take place preferably in 5th-19th Jan 1997 and the evaluation report will be finalized and submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO not later than 2 weeks after the field**

**mission.**

#### **IV. Scope of evaluation**

The immediate purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the project's objectives reflected the needs of the target groups, how the project was executed and the extent to which the initial targets have been met as well as the sustainability of the project. The evaluation team will, *inter alia*, assess the following elements:

##### *4.1 Relevance of the project*

- **relevance of the objectives in relation to the needs of the target groups and the general policy of the Government of Tanzania;**
- **efficiency of the institutional arrangements for project implementation;**
- **appropriateness of criteria for project selection and construction techniques as community contracts and labor based methods.**

##### *4.2 Project implementation*

- **adequacy of project designs, work plans, reporting and management;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by the counterpart agencies;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by CDC and the wider community in Hanna Nassif Settlement**
- **overall organization and technical supervision;**
- **physical progress, problems encountered and corrections made;**
- **labour utilization and productivity;**
- **appropriateness of form and level of incentives;**
- **effectiveness of community participation and community contracting system;**
- **cost of construction and cost-effectiveness of the project through comparative analysis with the data to be collected from other similar construction works;**
- **degree in which the project has been successfully implemented by the three UN agencies ( ILO, UNCHS and UNV) and the lessons learned from this inter - agency agreement.**

##### *4.3 Training program*

- **training programs, activities and relevance of training materials produced to the target groups.**

##### *4.4 Project Results*

- **quantity and quality of physical construction;**
- **improved living conditions (and extent to which water-borne related diseases have been reduced);**
- **number of short-term or long-term employment opportunities created through project activities;**
- **identification of beneficiaries and direct effects on their incomes;**
- **occurrence of multiplier effect, brought about by the increased households' incomes from the construction, especially their investment in microeconomic from the construction activities;**
- **degree to which the communities have developed their planning capacities;**
- **capacity building of relevant government institutions to carry out similar community-based programs with special reference to replicability and sustainability of the project approach,**

- including operation and maintenance of the developed works;
- capacity and effectiveness of the Community Development Committee to implement the project activities and to strengthen the organization/mobilization capacity of the community in Hanna Nassif.
- maintenance arrangements and participation by target groups.
- extent to which the project has been assimilated by community groups and government agencies at country and city level;

## V. Output

A standard UNDP in- depth evaluation report (5 typed copies) submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO. A copy of the report on diskette 3.5" in WP 5.1. is also required.

## ANNEX 2

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBRIEFING SESSION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION JANUARY 17, 1997 ILO Area Office

|                       |                    |                                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Nestor Joseph      | CDC                | Acting Chairman                    |
| 2. Hatima Ramadhani   | CDC                | Treasurer                          |
| 3. Mpayo Kasure       | City Commission    | Former Project Engineer            |
| 4. Dina Nnkya         | ILO                | Community Animator                 |
| 5. K.W. Salewi        | NIGP               | Civil Engineer                     |
| 6. M. Laiser          | NIGP               | Deputy Executive Director          |
| 7. Shaaban. Sheuya    | (ILO)/UCLAS        | Former project Coordinator         |
| 8. John Lupala        | Evaluation Mission | National Consultant (UCLAS)        |
| 9. Joyce Malombe      | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Nairobi University     |
| 10. Arpad Könye       | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Architect, Team Leader |
| 11. John Mbogoma      | UNDP               | Consultant                         |
| 12. F.T. Ernest       | City Commission    | For Commissioner of Planning       |
| 13. K. Pflieger       | UNDP               | Programme Officer                  |
| 14. Paul Schuttenbelt | SDP (HABITAT)      | Advisor, Programme Officer         |
| 15. Wilma Van Esch    | ILO                | Programme Officer                  |

## ANNEX 3 MISSION PROGRAMME

| SR NO | DAY & DATE              | ACTIVITY                    | TIME  | PLACE                 |
|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1     | Monday 6th January 1997 | Arrival of MS Joyce Malombe | 18.10 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

|    |                             |  |       |  |
|----|-----------------------------|--|-------|--|
| 2  | Tuesday 7th January 1997    | Arrival of A. Konye  | 08.20 | Dar es Salaam Airport                    |
|    |                             | Short visit to ILO Area Office                                       | 09.20 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
|    |                             | Signing of Contracts   | 10.00 | NIGP Office-Samora Avenue.               |
|    |                             | Meeting with ILO Area Director, Ms Singh & Wilma van Esch            | 12.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road  |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 15.30 | Hanna Nassif CDC Office                  |
| 3  | Wednesday 8th January 1997  | Meeting with Ms M. Kibogoya (LIFE)                                   | 09.30 | LIFE Office, UN Street                   |
|    |                             | Meeting with Jesse Kahwa (EDF)                                       | 11.00 | EDF Office, Kisutu.                      |
|    |                             | Meeting with A. Koroma (UNV)   | 12.00 | UNDP Office, Samora Avenue               |
|    |                             | Meeting with Prof. T. Rwebangira                                     | 16.00 | University of Dar es Salaam              |
| 4  | Thursday 9th January 1997   | Meeting with Prof. A.M. Nikundiwe, Principal, UCLAS                  | 09.00 | UCLAS Main Campus                        |
|    |                             | Meeting with B. Seleki (MLHUD)                                       | 14.00 | MLHUD, Sokoine Drive                     |
| 5  | Friday 10th January 1997    | Meeting with UNDP (Mr. Sisila, Mbogoma, Deputy Res. Rep Mr. Nhongo.) | 10.00 | UNDP Offices, Samora Avenue              |
|    |                             | Discussion with the ILO ( Wilma, Sheuya)                             | 14.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
| 6  | Saturday 11th January 1997  | Meeting with residents, Non-CDC members of Hanna Nassif              | 10.00 | Hanna Nassif                             |
|    |                             | Drafting and discussing table of contents of the report              | 12.00 | ILO Area Office.                         |
| 7  | Sunday 12th January 1997    | General Discussion on the Summary                                    | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 8  | Monday 13th January 1997    | Meeting with UNCHS and SDP (Paul Schuttenbelt and Majani B.B)        | 09.00 | Old Boma House, Sokoine Drive            |
|    |                             | Meeting with Shaaban Sheuya, Project Coordinator                     | 14.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 9  | Tuesday 14th January 1997   | Meeting with COWI-Consult (Claus Homman and Lema)                    | 09.00 | COWI-Consult Offices, Sea View, Upanga.  |
|    |                             | Meeting with NIGP (Mr. Salewi)                                       | 14.00 | NIGP Offices, Samora avenue              |
| 10 | Wednesday 15th January 1997 | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 14.00 | CDC Office, Hanna Nassif                 |
| 11 | Thursday 16th January 1997  | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |

|    |                                  |   |       |                       |
|----|----------------------------------|---|-------|-----------------------|
| 12 | Friday 17th<br>January<br>1997   | Finalisation of Draft Summary Report                              | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Debriefing of major findings and discussion of the summary report | 14.00 | ILO Area Office       |
| 13 | Saturday<br>18th January<br>1997 | Corrections and amendments of the summary report                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Departure of Ms Joyce Malombe                                     | 20.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |
| 14 | Sunday 19th<br>January<br>1997   | Departure of A. Konye   | 08.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

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## NOTES

### **1. A Gambian National**

### **2. A Liberian National**

**3. Under normal circumstances, many government employees supplement their incomes with part time jobs, be it in the formal or informal sector. Thus the stationing of DCC staff members to Hanna Nassif without adequate remuneration provide the possible explanation for their limited participation in the project.**

**4. It is a common practice for many workshops and seminars to pay sitting allowances to participants. This was not done for the case Hanna Nassif with the understanding that the time spent by the CDC members was part of their contributions to the project.**

**5. Local Fundis are locally trained masons, carpenters, and plumbers who actively engage in many construction works at local neighbourhood level.**

Updated by BC. Approved by SR. Last update: 31 March, 1998.

## *Evaluation of Hanna Nassif community based urban upgrading project phase I, cont.*

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### 4.0 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION



Construction of the main storm water drain by gabions



Completed murrum road

#### **4.1 Adequacy of Project Design, Preparatory Work, Reporting and Management**

As described earlier, the evaluation mission considers that the project design was logical and correct, but underestimated the difficulties of dealing with new urban communities. The implementation team was indulgent by accepting to work with incomplete designs and fluctuating technical staff. The fact that

Hanna Nassif project was implemented by the community, a stage by stage design and construction process which aimed at training the community in simple design and construction techniques was followed. It is factual that from traditional project management point of view, the fluctuating technical staff and lack of comprehensive designs resulted into delays, reconstruction of weak structures and increase in the construction costs. However, it is worth noting here that if the objective of training in skills of the local community was to be achieved, the adoption of traditional project management was likely to overshadow this objective. The ILO engineering consultant who worked closely together (although very irregular) with the community and counter part national engineer, facilitated the preparation of a training manual to local '*fundis*'<sup>5</sup> and the community at large. The need for establishing adaptive forms of design and construction techniques for both the local community and the traditional project management seems to be apparent.

It was important that the project team prepared and maintained detailed budget, financial plans, engineering cost estimates and comparisons on the basis of which the implementation could have been managed and community contracts awarded. At the time of the evaluation, it was still not possible to analyze costs and labour inputs due to lack of consolidated data. It was understood that an ILO Consultant will have to prepare these in the next few weeks.

There were regular Steering Committee Meetings chaired by the City Director who was also the Project Director. This procedure was later interrupted because there were frequent changes in the city leadership (City Directors). It became less frequent but the meetings continued until the end of the first phase of the project i.e. in August 1996. Besides Steering Committee Meetings, the project had several Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review meeting.

Every week there were TST and CDC meetings to review the progress of the project. There was therefore weekly, monthly and quarterly progress reports which were prepared by the TST up to October 1996. Also minutes of the CDC meetings addressing the progress of the project have been well documented.

#### **4.2 Efficiency of Institutional Arrangement for Project Implementation**

The general institutional arrangement seems to have been operating efficiently with a coordinatory mechanism which was facilitated by the Steering Committee, Inter-Agency meetings and one Tripartite Review Meeting. Each Agency played its role as was foreseen in the project document with the exception of some few incidences as elaborated in section 5.2

#### **4.3 Justification and Relevance of the Objectives**

The project document addressed one of the most acute problems of Hanna Nassif namely flooding. Due to constraints of the economy, the Government was unable to upgrade and alleviate poverty in the area and several other unplanned settlements. Considering the magnitude of the problems it also realized that it will not be able to solve these problems alone. The concept of empowering local communities to participate in construction of their most needed infrastructure seemed to be one of the most realistic alternatives of upgrading unplanned settlements. For this reason, community participation in infrastructure construction has been a realistic objective in Hanna Nassif project and will also be so for a long time in other similar projects in the country.

The Government has recognized the potential of community involvement and presently, this approach is being expanded to other settlements on the basis of preliminary results of Hanna Nassif. Similarly the concept of community involvement in settlement upgrading has been well incorporated in the Urban

Development Policy(1995) as pointed out in section 1.1.2. The project objectives were also strongly supported by several International Agencies and Donors.

#### 4.4 Achievement of Objectives

The **development objective** of the project was defined as *improved living conditions and expanded employment opportunities in urban settlements in Dar es Salaam*. The project largely achieved this objective. The project also supported the Government's policy as expressed in its Economic and Social Adjustment Programme which recommends the upgrading of infrastructure services, efficient mobilization of domestic resources and enhanced people's participation in the operation and maintenance.

Although no data was available to indicate the reduction of water -borne diseases, it was imperative that such improved infrastructure and especially in drainage leads to reduction of water-borne diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera and bilharzia. This should also improve the community health, reduce medical bills and thus increase potential savings. The household solid waste removal program managed by women groups contribute to better health conditions in Hanna Nassif. Similarly, there are household savings from reduced house repairs inflicted by annual floods. Improved accessibility has promoted commercial activities in the area where micro-enterprise activities are evident. Improved environmental conditions have also increased and stimulated improved land values and housing market in the settlement.

The **intermediate objective** was specified as the contribution to the achievement of the development objective *to demonstrate the feasibility of community-based approach to urban settlement up-grading*. The project achieved also this objective since the implementation of Phase I of Hanna Nassif through community management and contracts is a proof of the feasibility of the approach. The experience gained so far has been largely contributing to the improvement of other projects in Dar es Salaam city.

With regard to three **immediate objectives** the achievements were as follows:

**The immediate objective 1:** *A pilot project on community-based, employment intensive storm water drainage infrastructure up-grading of the Hanna Nassif informal settlement; creating in turn the capacity within Dar es Salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives*. The project and the inexperienced community were particularly successful to achieve this immediate objective by producing; **Output 1:** *A functioning and maintainable storm water and other basic infrastructure services improved to good technical standards*. The work was carried out by broad community participation and by using labour-intensive methods, community contracts and through the management of the CDC and the Technical Support Team. A total of 600 metres of main storm water channel, 1500 metres of side drain and 1000 meters of murram road have been constructed. The details of physical progress of the project have been explained under section 4.5. Similarly, training materials like videos, construction and maintenance guidelines and plans were prepared as was foreseen in the project document.

**Output 2:** *Employment created, in the magnitude of about 15,000 workdays of paid and 5,000 workdays of community contribution*. The project achieved the employment creation above this target i.e. 24,430 being 4,430 work days above the target. Of the created work days 65% constituted of man-days and 35%. women-days. Basically all construction work was carried out by using labour-based methods under community contracts The cost for the created work days was Tshs. Tshs 36.920.887. Unskilled laborers were paid about Tshs. 800/= while skilled laborers received Tshs. 1600/= a day. The project was also successful in training community members in construction skills, technical and legal aspects of community contracts, accounting and storekeeping. It was however, less successful in training community groups supposedly to be established as petty contractors at a later date. This was beyond the

financial and technical capability of the project, and thus an over-optimistic target.

**Output 3:** *A community management capacity to maintain the infrastructure constructed, coordinate its own physical development standards, and identify future priority needs.* The project prepared maintenance training materials and trained selected people through the actual construction works, workshops and seminars. Although the "10% maintenance fund" was available for the CDC, the project could not yet start the maintenance program. This will remain a priority task of the Phase II. On the other hand, the project could launch needed secondary activities, like waste removal through the establishment of active women's groups and a feasibility study for waste recycling. These programmes should be strengthened and expanded.

**The immediate objective 2:** *The capacity for the Dar es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner to community-based urban up-grading proposals be created and expanded.* The achievements were as follows:

**Output 1:** *A Technical working group trained in community-based up-grading.* There were difficulties to obtain the right seconded technical personnel from the DCC for the elaboration of designs and plans. It took also a long time to assign a survey team to the Kinondoni Zonal Office. However, a series of group meetings were held on Hanna Nassif by the SDP working group on unplanned settlements and other NGOs engaged in settlement up-grading activities. By this, a group of experts has been developed and trained in the concept.

**Output 2:** *A Training Manual giving step by step guidelines for replication of the process in other settlements prepared.* Although a manual as such was not prepared, but the project produced regular reports which were disseminated to and discussed with interested parties. The findings were extensively used in formulation of projects in the pipeline at the time of the evaluation by other agencies and donors.

**Output 3:** *A report on the impact of the project so as to avoid harmful effects during preparation and implementation of future proposals.* See output 4 below.

**Output 4:** *A survey report written identifying the next 10 unplanned settlements for replication.* Seven unplanned settlements were selected as priority project areas under the World Bank funded Community Infrastructure Programme. In these projects, the Hanna Nassif experience was widely used. Furthermore, Ardhi Institute prepared a socio-economic study on Hanna Nassif which is also being used by DCC Technical Staff under the SDP. The positive elements of Hanna Nassif are being adopted in other donor supported projects.

**The immediate objective 3:** *Targeted a support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni settlements, involving a network of community volunteers.* The project has experienced great difficulties in achieving this target. The obstacles are described under section. 3.3 in details. Several activities foreseen under outputs 2 and 3 are left for Phase II. The modest achievement is rather due to the over-optimistic project design than to the project team. It will, in all probability, take long time, until the culture of community ownership will be developed.

#### *4.4.1 Relationship Between Objectives, Outputs and Inputs*

The evaluation mission evidenced that the project document followed a logical design with regard of objectives and outputs, but it grossly underestimated the time and special expertise required to motivate communities, particularly to raise and collect community contributions and develop ownership spirit. It also underestimated the engineering inputs needed for preparation and implementation. However, considering the total budget of Phase I, the achievement so far, particularly the physical output was considerable and very positive. The project design should have foreseen activities going over to the

Phase II. This is now one of the priority task of the University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (UCLAS), the implementing agency of the second phase, namely to identify those activities which should continue.

#### 4.4.2 Beneficiaries

The population of Hanna Nassif are the primary beneficiaries of the project through the important infrastructure services created which improve living and health conditions in the settlement. The construction work created direct employment and income for community members, while the future operation and maintenance of the services will provide additional employment. The community also learned to identify, organize and manage such projects, handle technical and financial matters of the operation. Another beneficiary is the City Councils which, through secondment of staff to the project learned important experience on community managed settlement upgrading works. Future settlements will also benefit from the unique experience of Hanna Nassif.

Future community mobilizers and NGOs will benefit as well from both the positive and negative experience of the project when being trained in different aspects of community motivation and participation.

#### 4.5 Physical Progress Made

The physical progress made until 31<sup>st</sup> August 1996 is summarized in table 4.1 below;

**Table 4.1 Physical Progress Made as at 31st August 1996**

| SR NO | PLANNED ACTIVITY   | IMPLEMENTATION STATUS  | ESTIMATED % ACHIEVEMENT | REMARKS  |
|-------|--|--|-------------------------|--|
| 1.    | 2.5 Km murrum road with lined drains                           | 1.0 Km Murrum road with side drains (lined) constructed.                         | 40%                     | Special maintenance arrangement is needed before the road starts to erode. |
| 2.    | 1.5 Km lined drains  | 1.5 Km side drains and 0.6 km main drain.  | 80%                     | Main drain is almost completed.  |
| 3.    | 1.5 Km of improved footpath                                    | about 0.7 Km along the main drain and at the end of road No. 1 has been improved | 50%                     |  |
| 4.    | 11 protected points for drainage discharge into Msimbazi Creek | 2 major protected outlet constructed.  | --                      | Dependent on the revisions made in the plans.                              |
| 5.    | 10 road drifts   | More than 10 constructed   | 100%                    | More provision because of the change of design.                            |
| 6.    | 15 footpath culverts   | 10 vehicular culverts crossing main drain and road No. 1 have been constructed.  | 65%                     | Changed to cater for vehicular access.                                     |
| 7.    | Scour protection to existing gullies in the settlement         | Gabions provided instead   | 100%                    |  |

The overall quality of the work, particularly that of the drains is acceptable (with some exceptions) and

considerably better than what one would expect from inexperienced community labor. **The created infrastructure is functional, maintainable and serves the purposes.**

#### 4.6 Problems Encountered and Corrections Made

Despite the positive achievements in the physical progress of developing phase I of this project, there were few problems encountered during the implementation process and where necessary corrections made. These included the following:

- The project underestimated the need for comprehensive designs of both road and drainage channels. It seems the engineering design were made piece by piece concurrent with the construction stage. While the aim might have been to provide flexibility in the construction stages but this did not exempt the need of preparing comprehensive designs through which amendments could have been made. Subsequently due to lack of adequate supervision, some sections of the drain was to be demolished and reconstructed. COWI-consult was later on called to make some supervision of the construction and documentation of the designs.
- Some engineering components were also not or partially considered despite their significance in infrastructure works. For example laboratory soil tests, thickness and capacity of the road base and road design were given partial significance in such a construction work.
- Seemingly, the CDC and the TST who were deciding which type of work should be carried out and by who underestimated some of these inputs mainly in belief that they can be done without hiring a consultant or contractor. This brought some implementation problems which necessitated the need of engaging COWI- Consult to supervise the work.
- There are a few work items which still have to be completed. For example, hundreds of steel bars (10-40 cm long) are left standing out from the drain walls in very lengthy sections of the drain which may cause serious injuries to children and persons passing by. The walls of the open drain (some sections are 1.5 meter deep) do not have any uniform edges which would not only give a better engineering appearance to the drains, but protect people from slipping into the drain. The quality of the murrum road is also to be improved.

#### 4.7 Construction Costs and Cost Effectiveness

The cost breakdowns are as follows:

|                        |                 |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| Equipment              | Tshs 3.907.750  |
| Survey instruments     | US\$ 14.976     |
| Tools                  | Not quantified  |
| Construction materials | Tshs 76.095.109 |
| Labour wages           | Tshs 36.920.887 |

The funds spent on labour wages represent the sum of about US\$ 60,000, or little bit less than 25% of the total investment costs. This could indicate that the program was relatively less "labour-intensive" and more material intensive due to high cost of the reinforced concrete main drain. However the project can be classified as a labour based project as all work has been carried out by manual labour using hand

tools (the use of a concrete mixer is the only exception). This is also shown in the costs of equipment and tools which were very modest. Although final cost breakdowns are still not yet established, and no tender was organized which would allow comparison, it seems that the construction through community contracts was higher than COWI Consultants cost estimate. This may be due to the inexperience of the community to use labour and materials according to work standards, and the difficulty to organize construction works in a densely built-up area. The higher costs were also due to the urgency work measures, like working longer hours, as well as on Saturdays and Sundays, in order to complete the main drain as much as possible in the dry season. The main drain was partly constructed during the rainy season necessitating some of the works to be repeated. The devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling for the money which was budgeted in US\$ but released at later dates also contributed a reduction in the total available budget for construction costs (Refer to table 1.1).

In principle, community contracts are exempt of taxes, and exclude overhead costs and profit, they should therefore be more cost effective than private contractors' works.

On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that the project was implemented within the approved original budget and within reasonable time.

The project management did not prepare cost estimates and comparisons. For this reason it was not possible for the evaluation mission to analyze cost-effectiveness from the existing data. Based on consultations with Engineering Consultants, the evaluation team was of the opinion that the construction costs were on the higher side. The conclusion is based on the unit costs of infrastructure which is in the case of storm water drain was about US\$ 250 per metre, and that of road, about US\$ 48,000 per kilometre. Particularly the cost of the road was high. The greatest part of the investment was spent on materials and transport of cement, steel bars, timber and gravel. As mentioned earlier, one of the reason of the higher cost was certainly that all the works including procurement being carried out by an inexperienced CDC and unskilled workers under community contracts. The problems encountered at the beginning of the project which resulted into delays in the construction process also contributed to higher costs. Although the final quality is acceptable and the infrastructure is durable and maintainable, some of the work items, should have been done better if constant engineering input and experience in community managed projects was available.

The evaluation mission team underlines that the CDC, despite the described short-comings made a good job in producing the physical output.

#### **4.8 Community Contracting and Labour Based Methods**

The implementation methodology was through Community Construction Contracts (CCC). It was the CDC which, with the assistance of the TST, identified sub-projects, priorities and approved engineering designs. On the basis of bills of quantities for materials, the CDC awarded contracts for community members who executed the contracts. The CDC's Construction Committee took full responsibility for the supervision of the procurement, organization of voluntary and hired labor, construction activities and quality control. Of course the technical personnel largely assisted and guided the process which was community based in real terms. It should be underlined that the strong determination of the community to undertake all possible construction was the driving force behind the success of constructing the infrastructure. The evaluation mission, however noted also that the decision of the CDC to keep all contracts for community execution was a commanding act, but it overestimated the technical capabilities of the community and it resulted in problems in the construction (quality and costs). In the next phase it is advisable to make a clear distinction between works which can be implemented through community contracts and works which could be better carried out by labour-based contractors.

## 4.9 Training Programmes, Materials and Activities

Training programmes involved on job training to participating Masons, Carpenters and unskilled people. Seminars and workshops to both CDC and the people (beneficiaries) were also conducted. A study tour to Kenya and Uganda for some CDC members to visit similar projects has been planned and organized within the training programme. One Financial Clerk and a Stores Assistant have been trained to manage financial matters, procurement and storage of materials.

A total of 8 workshops were agreed upon including community awareness workshop, construction workshop, project implementation, CDC, community group identification, income generation and community evaluation. Five workshops were concentrating on construction and maintenance skills of the drains and road.

Substantial amount of training materials have been made available to the CDC. They include manuals, reports, consultancy reports, policy papers, books and booklets, maps, photographs, bulletins, newsletters and journals. A few of these materials have been translated into Swahili for use of the CDC members and the rest of Hanna Nassif people. Besides the above, the SDP had video-filmed the project for both documentation and training purposes.

### *4.9.1 Relevance of the Training Materials Produced to the Needs of the Target Group*

Many of the training materials have been written in English which might not be very useful to the common people who do not understand the language. However, for the skilled and learned people the materials produced will be used as reference and training inputs in construction skills. The audio and visual materials such as photographs and video films also provide an asset for training the people within Hanna Nassif.

## 4.10 Improved Planning Capacity of the Communities

**By the end of the first Phase, the Community and the CDC (despite their internal differences) gained experience and demonstrated true capabilities to address infrastructure needs of Hanna Nassif. It is commendable that the community organized and maintained the present alignment of the infrastructure which crossed through private lands and properties without demolition and compensation. It also recruited community labour. It was also capable of planning and executing all sequences of the construction, from planning through procurement to construction, which is a difficult task even for an experienced contractor. The CDC grew up to this task and proved that communities can complement city authorities by undertaking several responsibilities of infrastructure development in their respective settlements.**

## 4.11 Capacity Building of Relevant Government Institutions and Extent to Which the Concept has Been Accepted by Other Community Groups

**This objective was specifically targeted to the City Commission by involving its staff in the project so as to acquire more skills and experience in similar undertakings. The secondment of the city engineer, planners and a surveyor was a good approach to this endeavor. But the entire participation of Planners and the Engineer and the insufficient number of the seconded staff to the project does not guarantee that adequate capacity has been built to respond to the magnitude of problems of unplanned settlements at the city level. Additional inputs are still required to involve more DCC staff in other projects planned under the CIP so as to comprehend other community needs. However, for smaller projects similar to that of Hanna Nassif the capacity developed is a**

## **potential that can be utilised to solve problems in other settlements**

**In general, the project was successful in involving a large number of National Agencies and Institutions, as recommended in the project document. The progress of the project got wide media presentation. The Ardhi Institute (now UCLAS), one of the competent technical bodies of the country has been continuously engaged in studying and analyzing the project, while the City Council and International Agencies used and referred to the experience of Hanna Nassif in their new projects. Many of the responsible technical staff of these institutions are well informed of results and different aspects of the project. No doubt, Hanna Nassif became the reference of many other national project proposals.**

**The concept of community based infrastructure improvement has been widely accepted by the local communities as evidenced by the establishment of about 10 CBOs city wide. The establishment of these CBOs stems from the government failure to deliver services to the people. While the establishments of these CBOs started mainly in the 1990s, the pace at which they have emerged is a clear manifestation of acute infrastructure deficiency in unplanned settlements. It also reflects peoples' trust on CBOs and the common understanding that the Local Authorities can no longer reach the people at grassroots level.**

**As regards to Hanna Nassif, the establishment of the CDC was a good starting point despite its operational and organizational problems. The establishment of the CDC also motivated the establishment of women groups which have been working hand in hand with the CDC in the cleaning of the constructed drains. It was also observed that there exist a youth group which is yet to be registered. The Women and Youth groups have been undertaking specific issue based activities for environmental improvement and poverty alleviation.**

**As pointed out above (refer section 1.1.2), the Government, particularly the MLHUD incorporated community participation as a component in the Draft Urban Development policy of 1995 and the 1993 National Land Policy. This is a recognition of CBO efforts and the role they are playing to upgrade their settlements.**

**The provision of permit to the CDC to collect revenue from road toll for Hanna Nassif by the City Commission is also an understanding or acceptability of this concept from the Urban Local Authority point of view. It is in line with the idea of delegating responsibilities and powers to the grassroots CBOs. Possibilities also exist for the DCC to grant permit to the CDC to collect revenue from other sources so as to supplement revenue collected from road toll and enable the Community maintain the laid down infrastructure.**

### **4.12 Capacity and Effectiveness of the CDC to Implement the Project, Motivate and Mobilize the Community**

**The CDC was successful in mobilizing the community for the physical work and in constructing the infrastructure as well as handling project accounts. It demonstrated also initiatives and drive in contracting and mobilizing national agencies and donors. It was able to get recognition as the representative of the community. On the other hand, the CDC was not successful in motivating the community to contribute and undertake maintenance work due to described problems within the community (see section 3.5). It is the Phase II which has to carry out the required changes in the CDC and introduce an appropriate methodology on community mobilization.**

### **4.13 Role of the Three UN Agencies (ILO, UNCHS, UNV) and Lessons Learnt**

As explained in section 2.1, the role of each of these agencies was quite exemplary and efficient. However, a more extensive coordination was required from the part of the UNDP to streamline some of the misunderstanding which arose from the side of the UNV as pointed out in section 5.2

#### 4.14 Sustainability

##### *4.14.1 Operation and Maintenance Arrangements*

Occasional cleaning of the canal has been carried out. The women groups have been cleaning the channels after completion of the construction works. The 'new CDC' should rely and extend the activities of these groups. More residents should be mobilized to make regular cleaning and small maintenance on the section of the infrastructure which passes through, or is in front of their properties. Unfortunately, regular organized maintenance has not been started so far which is one of the set-backs of the project. It is imperative that routine and periodic maintenance works start without delay because several sections of the infrastructure, particularly that of the road show signs of deterioration. The CDC already possesses a considerable amount of money (i.e. Tshs 540,000) for this purposes and funds originated from the 10% of the donors' financed construction costs. Therefore the immediate financial input is available. Community contribution so far is unimportant. The launching of a viable maintenance system remains therefore the priority task of the second phase.

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## 5.0 LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS



**Completed murram roads and side drains. Side drains show lack of maintenance**



**The lessons drawn from Phase I of Hanna Nassif Community Based Urban Upgrading Project have been summarized as follows;**

### **5.1 Potentials Inherent in the Project**

- (i) The establishment of a functioning CDC which managed to make decisions and close supervision of the day to day activities of the project is a positive sign that the project can be successfully carried forward to phase II with some minor corrections.**
- (ii) The knowledge gained by the CDC members on the overall community, and project set-up, their roles and responsibility, the training in skills (e.g. store keeping and managing the accounts) and labour based construction techniques are potential gains that can be utilized in future operation and maintenance of the project.**
- (iii) The fact that more than 86% of the houses within Hanna Nassif are owner occupied, provide a chance of positive participation of residents if proper mobilization and trust is instilled among community members.**
- (iv) The constructed drains and roads are assets that the CDC can utilize to generated funds for the operation and maintenance and creation of jobs to residents of the area. Other benefit accruing from the project is the increase in land value and growth of petty trading and other home based enterprises.**
- (v) The project will continue to be a good example for Community Based Settlement Upgrading and therefore, it should be supported so as to achieve the desired objectives.**
- (vi) Community participation was observed to exist at two levels. The first one is the part being played by the CDC and the second one is the part played by the wider Community. At CDC level, there is no doubt that they tried their best to make the project a success despite its shortcomings. The CDC managed to work together with the Donor and Executing Agencies, the DCC, the TST and to some extent with the wider Community of Hanna Nassif. This task has never been done by any CBO in this country. On the part of the Community, they tried to participate wherever**

requested but as elaborated under section 3.0 the process of mobilization and building a community still calls for additional time to cultivate a sense of belonging and responsibility to community managed projects.

(vii) The TST constituted of personnel from the Executing Agencies and seconded staff from the DCC. The execution of Hanna Nassif project have exposed several members of the TST on how to deal with the problems within the local communities. As a pilot project, the knowledge gained by these members provide an asset in adapting similar approaches to other unplanned settlements of Dar es Salaam and the country at large.

## 5.2 Problems and Constraints

Despite of the achievements that have been registered in phase I of the project, there were several problems that hindered the achievement of the project objectives as summarized below;

- (i) Technical aspects particularly the comprehension of engineering design was not adequately addressed in beginning of the project. Although the approach was an attempt to involve the community in the design and construction stages, it was undermined by inadequate construction and supervisory work as compounded by the engineer who abandoned the project. The designs, supervision and other components like soil tests, comprehensive survey, etc. lacked in the beginning stage of the project.
- (ii) The role of the CDC in the project was somehow over-emphasized. This created a sense of being able to deliver technical works which otherwise were above the capabilities and experience of the CDC.
- (iii) The inter-Agency and multi-donor sponsored project execution provided a good experience on how co-ordination can collectively contribute to alleviating poverty, improving the living environment and generating employment. But somehow, the donor-specific objectives in provision of support slowed down the implementation process of the project.
- (iv) There were some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the project document which led to duplication of responsibilities. For instance while the project had already recruited the Project Coordinator and Animator for more than six months from the start of the project, the UNV was also in belief to assign a UNV personnel with Project Coordinator tasks.
- (v) While the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) is the beneficiary of the project, its participation in the project through secondment of staff particularly the Town planners was rather erratic. Other staff members frequently abandoned their seconded positions. This problem contributed to delays in the implementation process of the project. Except for the engineer and a surveyor who were seconded to the project under the UNCHS contracts, it was revealed that there were no incentives which were paid to the Planners. To some extent, this provide explanation for their erratic participation in the project. In future projects this issue has to be resolved.
- (vi) The Steering Committee Meetings were irregular due to the frequent changes of the city Directors. As of November 1996, the project has had five different Project Directors. This phenomenon contributed to the interruption in the implementation process since the City Director is also a signatory of the CDC project accounts.
- (vii) The Evaluation Mission noted that there were two Steering Committees one for Community Infrastructure Programme (CIP) and the other one for Hanna Nassif Project. Both committees are

**being chaired by City Commission. In order to simplify coordination and concentrate effort, it would have been more practical to have only one Steering Committee. This would also have enhanced sharing and learning.**

**(viii) Community mobilization and participation is a long process. There was therefore a need to give adequate time to address different community issues and not assume that the commitment of the CDC was shared by other members of the community. This was particularly important given past community experiences on development projects where people were never consulted and their participation was only assumed.**

**(ix) The commitment and enthusiasm of the CDC was also mistaken to mean a cohesive community. This wrong assumption was based on the fact that similar activities had not taken place before. There is therefore need for community leadership development and organization - a factor that was taken for granted at the beginning because community leaders were assumed to represent all the interests of the community.**

**(x) Lack of experiences with formation, running and leadership of CBOs also contributed to this very complex situation. Similarly, inadequate community mobilization augmented further the problem of poor community participation.**

**(xi) Failures in community contribution hinges heavily on the extent to which mobilization and participation of the entire community was carried out. This, also reiterates the issue of inadequate representation of the wider community.**

**(xii) Historical development and culture of the people plays an important part in mobilization and participation. The residents of this area had already been mobilized for activities that never took place and were therefore skeptical about the whole process. Again this manifested itself in the poor response in contribution from the community.**

**(xiii) Previously the government had been the main provider of services and it took time for community members to see their role and hence the reluctance to participate. Enthusiasm of the CDC is however notable in bridging this barrier and proving their commitment to change the situation. This idea of volunteering to guide the process was not necessarily shared by the wider community - a factor that explains their "sitting back and waiting for things to happen" attitude. Immediate participation of donors without proper preparation perpetuated this dependency syndrome.**

**(xiv) Excessive donor contribution augmented the problem of residents' contribution thinking that funds were readily available.**

**(xv) Cost contribution for priority infrastructure needs as well as for operation and maintenance responsibilities should be agreed with participating CBOs from the outset of the project. This is considered necessary not only to establish a demand-driven program to ensure a sense of commitment and ownership but also to overcome the above mentioned distrust and, in the case of Hanna Nassif prevent donor dependency which eroded cost recovery mechanisms.**

**(xvi) Within the community leadership, there existed a division of opposing group, the 'Wasomi' (the educated) who thought that the CDC should be composed of the educated people and the 'Wasiosoma' (the non-educated) who incidentally, constitute the majority of the current CDC. While the Wasiosoma have been promoting participation, the Wasomi group has been against these efforts.**

**(xvii) The legal status of the CDC is still at stake in so far as the Hanna Nassif Community Development Association (HNCDA) amended constitution is yet to be registered. Efforts should be made to finalize this task so as to institute a legally established Association in the area.**

**(xviii) Whilst efforts were made to support the establishment of the CDC there was no community planning. Even during the construction phase of the main drain there was a low level of understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the various actors including individuals, households, as well as the CDC.**

**(xix) This clearly indicate the importance of transparency and clear definition of the problem facing a particular section of the community. Regular reporting on the community fund is crucial to win community trust. People would like to have access to decision making mechanism over contribution they pay. Thus the process of laying down principles of accountability and peoples involvement in the decision making process seems to be very basic for the realization of participation and willingness to contribute.**

**(xx) There are some minor works which are yet to be completed for security and convenient utilization of the drains by the residents as elaborated under section 4.6**

### **5.3 Recommendations**

**(i) The construction of the second phase is recommended to start on the basis of full surveys, complete engineering designs, bill of quantities and cost estimates. Works that can be done by the community and by contractors should be distinguished. COWI Consult design input may be used as a model.**

**(ii) "External" technical assistance like engineering designs, construction supervision and community mobilization should be sought from the previous Agencies which were involved as executing and /or associated Agencies in the project. Similarly, technical assistance may be sought from petty contractors (for those available) and consultants where the implementing agent may fall short of such services.**

**(iii) All engineering works should be completed in order to ensure proper functioning of the infrastructure and facilitate regular maintenance of the created assets. These works include, completion of the remaining section of the main drain, completion of the edge of the main drain, cutting the erecting steel bars and providing covers or protection walls where it was observed to be unsafe to children and night walks.**

**(iv) Coordination of upgrading programs at city level and dissemination of the Hanna Nassif experiences to facilitate learning should be ensured. This can be done by maintaining one Steering Committee for all upgrading projects.**

**(v) The explanation of the roles of the National Executing Agencies, the NIGP, DCC, UCLAS, CDC and supporting UN Agencies, the ILO, UNCHS and UNV need to be clearly defined from the very beginning of the second phase of the project.**

**(vi) The DCC should provide more support to the CDC activities through secondment of its qualified technical staff as it used to be in the first phase of the project. However, special remuneration and financial support should be provided to the team members seconded to the project. This will ensure their permanent attachment and gaining experience in community infrastructure upgrading works.**

(vii) The DCC should revise its legal aspects, responsibilities and powers so as to enable CDC undertake small upgrading activities in their localities and collect revenue for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure works. Property taxes, land rents, road tolls, user charges, may be partially or wholly collected by the CDC for the purpose of funding operational activities in their areas. Experience shows that revising DCC regulations and by-laws prove to be a time consuming exercise. In order to ease the process, interim procedures such as memoranda of agreement may be persuaded whereby the CDC enters into a compromise with the DCC in making collections of the taxes. It is recommended that the tax collection exercise using a CBO be pioneered in Hanna Nassif and if proved successful, a mechanism of adopting it to other parts of the city should be instituted.

(viii) Formation and strengthening of small groups within Hanna Nassif is very important. This will encourage such groups to address different issues. The approach in doing so may include the subdivision of Hanna Nassif settlement into smaller issue based community groups with cohesive force that will ease communication between the CDC and these groups. Such groups should elect their leaders who will represent them in the CDC. The community groups should be clearly defined both geographically and if possible socio-economically.

(ix) Future projects need to allocate more time and resources to community mobilization since it is an essential pre-requisite for any community based initiative. This is not simply to establish, strengthen, train and empower CBOs in their role as service coordinators, but additional inputs are required to overcome the major distrust that has been built up between CBOs and the administration over many years.

(x) Adequate community mobilization and planning will confirm grassroots priority needs, levels and standards of affordable service provision, resolve conflicting interests, agree upon optimal plan, strengthen local ownership and commitments, whilst paving the way for active CBO involvement in plan implementation. It is therefore recommended that in phase 2, emphasis should be put in mobilization and participation. For this, there is a need for trained staff who understand community mobilization, organization and participation. This is an issue that has to be spearheaded by local people who understand the dynamics of the communities involved. Technical personnel cannot be expected to perform this role and so are inexperienced community animators.

(xi) Development of community leadership and resolving of the current leadership wrangles must also be dealt with. This is particularly important given the fact that the current leadership is divided - a fact that jeopardizes the wider community involvement. There is a need for an impartial moderator to discuss the existing problems with the two groups and come out with a solution so as to come up with a smooth transition to elected representatives. Further it will be important to hold elections after the registration of the CBO. There is however, a need for communities to be sensitized on the whole process. The roles of leaders should be clearly discussed and allow the communities to select leaders that they can trust. The three year term of CDC members has elapsed. It is important to maintain continuity and not lose all the skills learned in the first phase. There is a need therefore, to retain at least one-third of the current CDC leadership. The current leadership division between the educated "*wasomi*" and the illiterate "*wasiosoma*" has to be resolved immediately because it threatens the smooth running of the project. For example, one group is promoting participation while another is de-motivating the community from involvement.

(xii) Future projects should insist on equal representation of men and women in development committees. The Hanna Nassif project set a good example in repeating elections in order to allow adequate representation of women. This is an issue that should not be left to community leaders

who mostly follow traditions that exclude women from the decision making process. The requirement to include women was particularly important because this is not traditionally a sector where women are automatically involved. Paid labor based construction has been a domain of men is well illustrated by the low participation of women at the beginning of the project. Their involvement later increased and by the end of the project their contribution constituted 35% of the total labor.

(xiii) Equal participation of women in both leadership and employment should also be ensured. Women groups who are involved in maintenance and provision of community services should be supported and trained. Young people of the settlement should have access to employment created by such projects. Extra efforts should be made to make the women and youths groups registered and cooperate with the CDC in both execution of the next phase of the project and the operation and maintenance of the already laid down infrastructure. By doing so, several projects can be executed within the community and the process of mobilizing the community will be simplified.

(xiv) The community contract system should continue and be improved in order to better address employment needs. There is also need for a revolving fund to enable communities to undertake other economic activities because temporary employment solves only a part of the problems. Initiation of new activities will be possible given the fact that the infrastructure services are already operational.

(xv) The launching of training to small / petty contractors at the preparatory stage of the second phase should be made possible under, or in cooperation with other such training centres to train selected community members in infrastructure design and construction skills.

(xvi) Community contribution should be given due consideration in the next phase. A special contribution mechanism should be instituted and effectively monitored. Transparency in both contributions, external support and expenditure of collected revenue should be instilled. Special expertise is required to support this activities, qualified national consultants and NGO's have to be invited to assist, and in case of lack of such expertise, special training programs should be organized for individuals and NGOs;

(xvii) The constitutions of the CDC's should be legally registered and existing ones revisited to reflect the current requirements of the local residents. Residents should participate in the making of constitution and subsequent revisions.

Dar es Salaam, May 1997

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PROJECT EVALUATION HANNA NASSIF

#### IMPROVING LIVING CONDITIONS AND EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN URBAN-LOW INCOME COMMUNITIES

##### I. Background information

**The project is part of an inter-agency program aimed at improving living conditions and expanding employment opportunities in low income settlements.**

**Hanna Nassif settlement is located in Kinondoni District, Dar Es Salaam. The area covers 44 and has a population of 19,000 people. In this settlement severe flooding occurs during the rainy season due to absence of drainage channels. The rainwater mixes with uncollected garbage and overflow from overtaxed latrines, thus causing health hazards.**

**UNDP, Ford Foundation and EDF (European Development Fund) are funding the project and ILO with associated agencies of UNCHS and UNV are executing. Originally the project duration was eighteen months, starting March 1994 and ending August 1995. However, in August 1995 a tripartite meeting took place and in that it was decided that the project should continue until March 1996.**

**The three immediate objectives are as follows:**

- 1. A pilot project on community-based employment-intensive storm water drainage infrastructure upgrading of Hanna Nassif will be successfully completed; introducing in turn some capacity within the Dar Es Salaam City Council to respond to such community based initiatives.**
- 2. The capacity for the Dar-Es Salaam City Council to continue to deal in a responsive, enabling manner with community-based urban upgrading proposals will be created and expanded.**
- 3. A support mechanism for community-based initiatives from Kinondoni unplanned settlements, involving a network of community volunteers, will be established.**

**The activities under the present project have resulted in the formulation of new project proposals for continuation and expansion of the community based, labor intensive upgrading works in Dar Es Salaam**

**The purpose of the evaluation is to establish:**

- The relevance of the project objectives for urban upgrading in unplanned settlements.**
- The extent to which the project objectives have been achieved and**
- To make recommendations about its future orientations.**

## **II. Composition of mission team**

**The mission should consist of three independent consultants:**

- one expert on socio-economic and planning aspects of urban development with special reference to, low income settlements and**
- one expert in civil engineering with sufficient knowledge of labor based construction techniques in relation to roads and drainage in urban areas.**
- one national consultant who will be responsible for prior compiling the raw data and running a social and economic survey, together with project staff.**

**The mission should preferably have one member who speaks Swahili.**

## **III. Time schedule**

**The mission will take place preferably in 5th-19th Jan 1997 and the evaluation report will be finalized and submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO not later than 2 weeks after the field**

**mission.**

#### **IV. Scope of evaluation**

The immediate purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether the project's objectives reflected the needs of the target groups, how the project was executed and the extent to which the initial targets have been met as well as the sustainability of the project. The evaluation team will, *inter alia*, assess the following elements:

##### *4.1 Relevance of the project*

- **relevance of the objectives in relation to the needs of the target groups and the general policy of the Government of Tanzania;**
- **efficiency of the institutional arrangements for project implementation;**
- **appropriateness of criteria for project selection and construction techniques as community contracts and labor based methods.**

##### *4.2 Project implementation*

- **adequacy of project designs, work plans, reporting and management;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by the counterpart agencies;**
- **degree to which the project is supported by CDC and the wider community in Hanna Nassif Settlement**
- **overall organization and technical supervision;**
- **physical progress, problems encountered and corrections made;**
- **labour utilization and productivity;**
- **appropriateness of form and level of incentives;**
- **effectiveness of community participation and community contracting system;**
- **cost of construction and cost-effectiveness of the project through comparative analysis with the data to be collected from other similar construction works;**
- **degree in which the project has been successfully implemented by the three UN agencies ( ILO, UNCHS and UNV) and the lessons learned from this inter - agency agreement.**

##### *4.3 Training program*

- **training programs, activities and relevance of training materials produced to the target groups.**

##### *4.4 Project Results*

- **quantity and quality of physical construction;**
- **improved living conditions (and extent to which water-borne related diseases have been reduced);**
- **number of short-term or long-term employment opportunities created through project activities;**
- **identification of beneficiaries and direct effects on their incomes;**
- **occurrence of multiplier effect, brought about by the increased households' incomes from the construction, especially their investment in microeconomic from the construction activities;**
- **degree to which the communities have developed their planning capacities;**
- **capacity building of relevant government institutions to carry out similar community-based programs with special reference to replicability and sustainability of the project approach,**

- including operation and maintenance of the developed works;
- capacity and effectiveness of the Community Development Committee to implement the project activities and to strengthen the organization/mobilization capacity of the community in Hanna Nassif.
- maintenance arrangements and participation by target groups.
- extent to which the project has been assimilated by community groups and government agencies at country and city level;

## V. Output

A standard UNDP in- depth evaluation report (5 typed copies) submitted to UNDP, Ford Foundation and ILO. A copy of the report on diskette 3.5" in WP 5.1. is also required.

## ANNEX 2

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBRIEFING SESSION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION JANUARY 17, 1997 ILO Area Office

|                       |                    |                                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Nestor Joseph      | CDC                | Acting Chairman                    |
| 2. Hatima Ramadhani   | CDC                | Treasurer                          |
| 3. Mpayo Kasure       | City Commission    | Former Project Engineer            |
| 4. Dina Nnkya         | ILO                | Community Animator                 |
| 5. K.W. Salewi        | NIGP               | Civil Engineer                     |
| 6. M. Laiser          | NIGP               | Deputy Executive Director          |
| 7. Shaaban. Sheuya    | (ILO)/UCLAS        | Former project Coordinator         |
| 8. John Lupala        | Evaluation Mission | National Consultant (UCLAS)        |
| 9. Joyce Malombe      | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Nairobi University     |
| 10. Arpad Könye       | Evaluation Mission | Consultant, Architect, Team Leader |
| 11. John Mbogoma      | UNDP               | Consultant                         |
| 12. F.T. Ernest       | City Commission    | For Commissioner of Planning       |
| 13. K. Pflieger       | UNDP               | Programme Officer                  |
| 14. Paul Schuttenbelt | SDP (HABITAT)      | Advisor, Programme Officer         |
| 15. Wilma Van Esch    | ILO                | Programme Officer                  |

## ANNEX 3 MISSION PROGRAMME

| SR NO | DAY & DATE              | ACTIVITY                    | TIME  | PLACE                 |
|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-----------------------|
| 1     | Monday 6th January 1997 | Arrival of MS Joyce Malombe | 18.10 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

|    |                             |  |       |  |
|----|-----------------------------|--|-------|--|
| 2  | Tuesday 7th January 1997    | Arrival of A. Konye  | 08.20 | Dar es Salaam Airport                    |
|    |                             | Short visit to ILO Area Office                                       | 09.20 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
|    |                             | Signing of Contracts   | 10.00 | NIGP Office-Samora Avenue.               |
|    |                             | Meeting with ILO Area Director, Ms Singh & Wilma van Esch            | 12.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road  |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 15.30 | Hanna Nassif CDC Office                  |
| 3  | Wednesday 8th January 1997  | Meeting with Ms M. Kibogoya (LIFE)                                   | 09.30 | LIFE Office, UN Street                   |
|    |                             | Meeting with Jesse Kahwa (EDF)                                       | 11.00 | EDF Office, Kisutu.                      |
|    |                             | Meeting with A. Koroma (UNV)   | 12.00 | UNDP Office, Samora Avenue               |
|    |                             | Meeting with Prof. T. Rwebangira                                     | 16.00 | University of Dar es Salaam              |
| 4  | Thursday 9th January 1997   | Meeting with Prof. A.M. Nikundiwe, Principal, UCLAS                  | 09.00 | UCLAS Main Campus                        |
|    |                             | Meeting with B. Seleki (MLHUD)                                       | 14.00 | MLHUD, Sokoine Drive                     |
| 5  | Friday 10th January 1997    | Meeting with UNDP (Mr. Sisila, Mbogoma, Deputy Res. Rep Mr. Nhongo.) | 10.00 | UNDP Offices, Samora Avenue              |
|    |                             | Discussion with the ILO ( Wilma, Sheuya)                             | 14.00 | ILO Area Office, Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road. |
| 6  | Saturday 11th January 1997  | Meeting with residents, Non-CDC members of Hanna Nassif              | 10.00 | Hanna Nassif                             |
|    |                             | Drafting and discussing table of contents of the report              | 12.00 | ILO Area Office.                         |
| 7  | Sunday 12th January 1997    | General Discussion on the Summary                                    | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 8  | Monday 13th January 1997    | Meeting with UNCHS and SDP (Paul Schuttenbelt and Majani B.B)        | 09.00 | Old Boma House, Sokoine Drive            |
|    |                             | Meeting with Shaaban Sheuya, Project Coordinator                     | 14.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
| 9  | Tuesday 14th January 1997   | Meeting with COWI-Consult (Claus Homman and Lema)                    | 09.00 | COWI-Consult Offices, Sea View, Upanga.  |
|    |                             | Meeting with NIGP (Mr. Salewi)                                       | 14.00 | NIGP Offices, Samora avenue              |
| 10 | Wednesday 15th January 1997 | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |
|    |                             | Meeting with the CDC   | 14.00 | CDC Office, Hanna Nassif                 |
| 11 | Thursday 16th January 1997  | Preparation of draft Summary Report                                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office                          |

|    |                                  |   |       |                       |
|----|----------------------------------|---|-------|-----------------------|
| 12 | Friday 17th<br>January<br>1997   | Finalisation of Draft Summary Report                              | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Debriefing of major findings and discussion of the summary report | 14.00 | ILO Area Office       |
| 13 | Saturday<br>18th January<br>1997 | Corrections and amendments of the summary report                  | 08.00 | ILO Area Office       |
|    |                                  | Departure of Ms Joyce Malombe                                     | 20.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |
| 14 | Sunday 19th<br>January<br>1997   | Departure of A. Konye   | 08.00 | Dar es Salaam Airport |

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## NOTES

### **1. A Gambian National**

### **2. A Liberian National**

**3. Under normal circumstances, many government employees supplement their incomes with part time jobs, be it in the formal or informal sector. Thus the stationing of DCC staff members to Hanna Nassif without adequate remuneration provide the possible explanation for their limited participation in the project.**

**4. It is a common practice for many workshops and seminars to pay sitting allowances to participants. This was not done for the case Hanna Nassif with the understanding that the time spent by the CDC members was part of their contributions to the project.**

**5. Local Fundis are locally trained masons, carpenters, and plumbers who actively engage in many construction works at local neighbourhood level.**

Updated by BC. Approved by SR. Last update: 31 March, 1998.